Unveiling Fantasy in the American Gothic by Neroni, Olga Jacqueline
University at Albany, State University of New York
Scholars Archive
English Honors College
5-2015
Unveiling Fantasy in the American Gothic
Olga Jacqueline Neroni
University at Albany, State University of New York
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/honorscollege_eng
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in English
by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neroni, Olga Jacqueline, "Unveiling Fantasy in the American Gothic" (2015). English. 20.
https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/honorscollege_eng/20
Unveiling Fantasy in the American Gothic 
	  
 
 
 
An honors thesis presented to the 
Department of English 
University at Albany, SUNY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for graduation with Honors in English 
and 
graduation from The Honors College. 
 
 
 
 
 
Olga Jacqueline Neroni 
 
Research Advisor: James Lilley, Ph.D. 
Second Reader: Paul Stasi, Ph.D. 
 
 
May 2015  
	   	   Neroni	  2 
	  
 
 
Abstract 
 
In The Plague of Fantasies, Slavoj Žižek charts the relationship between theoretical 
ideology, fantasy, and ideology in practice. While ideology roots itself firmly in our lives—it 
crafts our very reality according to Žižek—it is a paradoxically fragile and self-destructive 
system of interacting symbols. We consume and perpetuate fantasy in order to elucidate and 
internalize the laws of ideology by placing these symbols into dialogue with one another. In turn, 
fantasy often draws these laws to their conceptual edge, granting bodies and voices to the 
underlying fears and desires implied by these symbols. Edgar Allan Poe’s “Ligeia” and William 
Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury employ the perspective of a problematically labeled 
“unreliable” narrator to embody the fears and desires surrounding the symbol of the ideal 
Southern lady within the context of the Southern United States. The reader is limited to the 
senses and perception of an unconventional narrator. In order to gain understanding of these 
narrative topographies, she must first seek to understand the difficult perspective of the seer. By 
reading beyond the unreliable perspective and recognizing the narrator as a consciously crafted 
part of the text, the reader can analyze the potential purpose of such a narrative technique.  
Consequentially, the narrator, in embodying the inner monologue of a subscriber to this given 
ideological system, provides the reader with a private, detached context in which to observe 
possible incongruence between symbols of ideology and the reality they represent. This, in turn, 
allows the reader to develop the skill of questioning and analyzing the implied ideological 
assumptions conveyed through this type of narrative, and recognizing it in the broader context of 
various historical moments, including her own. 
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Introduction 
 
The “unreliable narrator” trope has been a staple in classrooms and literary criticism 
since it was coined in 1961, but the nature of the label “unreliable” has been neglected. The 
image of the human according to Enlightenment period humanism is that of a stable, 
autonomous, earthly individual independent from spirituality. Man is reason separated from 
religion. To call a human narrator “unreliable” strips him or her of the variable perspective and 
plasticity of thought that reason, the defining characteristic of man, provides. Historically, these 
narrators tend to belong to marginalized social groups such as people of color, women, the 
addicted, and the mentally ill. As the field of posthumanist theory expands, the secular humanist 
ideal of man no longer dominates critical thought. Instead, we aim to re-conceive the human not 
as an autonomous, fixed individual, but as a being who gains understanding by assuming 
multiple perspectives. Especially in the modern world, the human, according to critical theorists 
such as Donna Haraway, is not hugely different from inhuman. Evolutionarily, humans are not 
superior to animals, or particularly different, and in the postmodern era, machines have been 
replacing and alienating human labor. The posthuman is fluid and “ambiguously natural and 
crafted” (Haraway), as is the ideology in which the human exists, but this label, which gives 
negative connotations to important diverse perspectives, remains. In “Beside Onself: On the 
Limits of Sexual Autonomy,” Judith Butler discusses the way incessant categorization 
undermines community. Those who fail to fit neatly into a category become susceptible to 
institutionally approved, perhaps implicitly or explicitly, violence. In Butler’s work, the task of 
humans remains to live without categorizing oneself and others into individual spaces, to live in 
the borders between them. Highly affective, fantastical literature, literature that evokes and 
requires a subjective emotional response, particularly the anxiety and horror-inducing gothic 
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narrative, provides an individualized space for a reader to explore and challenge the subjectivity 
of contemporary moral and epistemological assumptions. As in Žižek’s view of fantasy, what we 
read as a detached narrative space supplements our understanding of the ideological laws of our 
society.  
 I will focus particularly on the short fiction of Edgar Allan Poe and William Faulkner’s 
The Sound and the Fury. Poe’s short stories captivate audiences with a distinct macabre element 
of human perversity, and indeed, Poe writes at length about the spirit of perversity, an animalistic 
urge to act cruelly and violently, hidden in all of us, but at shallow depths. Subsequently, his 
stories feature monstrous humans, and humans captivated by monstrous Freudian uncanny 
figures. The critical focus long remained on this perversity and a fascination with the man who 
created it to cultivate a misleading image of Poe as a tortured genius obsessed with dying women 
and terrified of being buried alive. Poe’s spirit of perversity can, in fact, be considered to 
represent a much wider sort of animalistic desire of acting outside the range of normal behavior. 
Perversity, perhaps, does not need to involve physical violence, but encourages a subversion or 
perversion of ideology. More recent scholarship, such as that of Joan Dayan, suggest a much 
more richly textured narrative that uses stock gothic elements of the monstrous, the perverse, and 
the pure, white lady to address the monstrosity of contemporary rhetoric on race and the ideals of 
love.  
 From Poe, I will continue to William Faulkner’s 1929 novel, The Sound and the Fury. 
The novel is considered at once modernist as well as Southern Gothic because of its publication 
during the interwar period and conscious split from traditional literary style as well as it 
borrowing of key Gothic elements, such as the Grotesque, applied specifically to the Southern 
United States. It is written from the point of view of several mentally afflicted narrators with 
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variable perceptions of time, as well as one with a very steady, almost biblical view of time. 
Famously named after the lamentation in Macbeth’s soliloquy that “life…is a tale/ Told by an 
idiot, full of sound and fury,/ Signifying nothing” (Shakespeare 5.5), the novel embodies what 
the mind of an “idiot” sees and hears, and leaves the reader to piece the information together, 
then supplements it with other perspectives on the same series of events. As indicated through 
the title, the work grapples with a similar struggle with the inevitable decay of time as is depicted 
in Macbeth. The titular character and his precarious empire fall to the procession of time, and so 
do the narrators of Faulkner’s modern tragedy watch their domain crumble. Instead of the subtle 
inclusion of raced language into an otherwise formulaic gothic tale seen in Poe, of course 
constricted by publishers in Antebellum Virginia, we see a shocking, avant-garde modernist 
approach to devoting the literary stage to the unconventional narrator. The narration itself 
becomes equally important as what the narrator chooses to describe. Where Poe’s narrators 
described the unconventional ideals of beauty that captivated them, Faulkner’s narrators, Benjy 
and Quentin Compson, embody the unconventional, uncanny figure in a derelict mental and 
physical space. The novel’s first half is difficult, and unreadable without active participation and 
note taking from the reader because of the unmarked leaps in time, place, and narrator. What the 
reader draws out of the narration, after assembling a timeline supplemented by the more 
accessible narrators of the second half, is the horror of three men witnessing the decay of their 
family and ideological system, and another family’s survival of that same cataclysm. By actively 
seeking understanding, building the timelines and genealogies necessary to comprehend the 
narrative, the reader builds an inevitable connection with the unreliable narrators, and begins to 
understand a different form of reality based on individual perspective. 
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Part I: Understandings of Subjectivity in Narrative and Perspective 
 
 
Narrative and Human Unreliability 
 
 The “unreliable narrator” trope has been a staple in classrooms and literary criticism 
since it was coined in 1961 in Wayne C. Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction. Unreliable narrators, 
like Faulkner’s Benjy and Quentin Compson, or Poe’s many mad and tortured characters, have 
captivated readers’ and critics’ attentions as heralds of unfiltered human desire. Critics have 
struggled with official categorizations of unreliable narration, and though more recent 
explanations have begun to explore the subjective nature of reliability, the problematic and 
subjective label remains. A narrator’s duty is not one of testimony. He or she is an integral 
component of a carefully and deliberately crafted fictional narrative. To call a narrator 
“unreliable” strips him or her of the variable perspective and plasticity that reason, the defining 
characteristic of man from beast, provides, which Western society cherishes as an inalienable 
right. A narrator who provides a point of view divergent from a reader’s perception of normality 
provides an equally valid opinion of a version of events. Furthermore, one must remember that, 
as a product of a conscious aesthetic choice, narrative voice serves a purpose. I argue that this 
type of narrative landscape provides an individualized context for a reader to consider the 
validity of, and alternatives to, contemporary moral and epistemological assumptions.  
Booth calls a narrator unreliable when she does not speak or act “in accordance with the 
norms of the work,” or the implied author’s norms (157). The implied author, also coined by 
Booth in the same work, is the reader-imagined personality standing behind the work, separate 
from the factual author, who makes decisions about the narrative voice. Booth admits this 
categorization of discrepancy between two imagined entities is “hopelessly inadequate,” and was 
meant as a simplified explanation, and yet it persists (Booth 158). More recent critics have 
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developed the definition to include typological distinctions, literary frames of reference and 
textual clues, and the roles of reader, text, and implied author in generating the image of the 
unreliable narrator. But, they still fail to address the nature of the “unreliable” label. In “The 
Lessons of ‘Weymouth’: Homodiegesis, Unreliability, Ethics, and The Remains of the Day” 
(1999), James Phelan and Mary Patricia Martin develop six different categories of the unreliable 
narrator who falls short or distorts whatever she is reporting based on axes of facts, ethics, and 
knowledge (Phelan 93-6). Though a step forward from earlier works such as William Riggan’s  
Picaros, Madmen, Naifs, and Clowns (1981), which divides unreliable narrators into the titular 
categories inseparable from the negative social images they conjure, Phelan and Martin’s model 
still fails to recognize how a reader decides to interpret a narrator as (un)reliable. Through their 
instant visual and social connections, Riggan’s categories, as well as other critics’, indicate that 
the decision is a value judgment specific to cultural and historical context, and so do Phelan 
Martin’s axes of ethics and knowledge. In fact, Ansgar Nünning breaks down the basic 
underlying determinations of reliability in these and similar texts to be related to understandings 
of common sense, normal psychological behavior, linguistic and literary conventions, and 
cultural understandings of ethics, none of which serve an independent standard, in general or for 
evaluating narrative perspective (Nünning 97). The discussion of these determinants is 
unavoidable, but the way in which we view narration and perception should attempt to address 
their subjectivity. Nünning suggests that defining unreliability serves as an interpretive strategy 
for readers to naturalize purposeful textual ambiguities to a personally chosen frame of reference.
 In “Historicizing Unreliable Narration: Unreliability and Cultural Discourse in Narrative 
Fiction,” Bruno Zerweck refers to this understanding as a groundbreaking paradigm shift. 
Recognizing (un)reliability as a result of a personal cognitive strategy addresses the label’s 
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automatic subjectivity. Additionally, Zerweck calls for another “fundamental paradigm shift” 
beyond Nünning’s “toward a greater historicity and cultural awareness,” or what he calls a 
“cultural-narratological theory” (Zerweck 151). While interpreting a text, the reader must 
consider the literary, ethical, and cultural conventions and understandings of the period during 
which the text was composed. What would be considered unreliable now may not have been at 
the time of publication. Vera Nünning gives the example of a changing reception of The Vicar of 
Wakefield as a “paradigm of virtue and decency” until the 1960s, after which it seemed 
“satirical,” “ironic,” and having a “hypocritical” and thus unreliable narrator (Zerweck 158). In 
addition to a necessary greater cultural and historical awareness, I believe that the discussion of 
unconventional, rather than unreliable, narrators should address the historical development and 
trajectory of understandings of the human subject. Unreliability first requires reliability to 
contrast with, and the concept of the unreliable narrator presupposes that a reliable narrator, a 
reliable human, exists. 
Flourishing in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the humanist movement focused 
contemporary intellectual discourse on the study the natural dignity of man, including his 
advanced intellect and ability to reason. Valuing the superior reason and infallibility of the 
senses, Renaissance humanism emphasized the value of the individual, regardless of social and 
economic status, as a superior earthly being. God was still the “Great Mover,” but man had the 
advantage over other earthly creatures of choosing perspective and theorizing spirituality.1 By 
the Enlightenment period, humanist ideas developed into radical, secular departures from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This is interestingly reflected in the changing understanding of geography from the Medieval to Early Modern 
period. The Medieval Mappa Mundi uses pilgrimage destinations and religiously significant locations as reference 
points while largely ignoring scale and placement of major natural features. Early Modern maps included more 
scientifically accurate information to aid in safe travel and trade. They still often featured elaborate theological 
ornamentation, such as angels blowing on the world to create winds, but mostly served very earthly purposes not 
connected with theological education (Murakami 2014).	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religious dogmatism (Guinness 5). The human is not only the supreme earthly being and an 
autonomous, unified subject, but the human mind and intellect also do not depend on any 
spiritual understanding of a higher entity. During and after the Enlightenment, humanism 
encompassed a variety of vague definitions of humanity. A variety of philosophical approaches 
evaluated humanity in relation nature, autonomy, capability, values, and value of human beings. 
Some of the most notable discussions included the Hobbes versus Locke debate on intrinsic 
human morality, Rousseau’s understanding of natural rights, and Descartes’ cogito ergo sum 
argument of fundamental epistemological principles. More important than the different 
definitions and facets of humanity it presented, the enduring philosophical and epistemological 
focus on humanist thought demonstrates a persisting respect for human intellectual superiority 
and desire to explore its depths.  
As the field of posthumanist theory expands, the secular humanist ideal of man as a 
universal reference point possessing intrinsic value and autonomy no longer dominates critical 
thought. Instead, contemporary scholars aim to re-conceive the human as a being who gains 
understanding through fluid perspective, not a fixed, autonomous individual. In the modern 
world especially, a single human is not different or even separate from any other human, or, 
according to some critics such as Dona Haraway, from the inhuman animal or machine because 
we are “ambiguously natural and crafted” (292). There is natural evidence for this: 
evolutionarily, humans are not superior to other animals, or particularly different. But it is also a 
product of our culture: in the postmodern era, machines continue to replace and alienate human 
labor, and we rely on man-made inventions to aid us in the simplest of tasks. Geneticists and 
human biologists theorize that our ability to create technology has enabled us to change and slow 
the course of natural selection, which is both a testament to our superior intelligence, but may 
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also be an eventual death sentence. Through development of technology and a change of 
lifestyle, we eliminate countless physical and biological stressors that would otherwise weed out 
suboptimal alleles, but we have become increasingly dependent on these technologies (Nesse).2 
Truly, we are cyborgs. More importantly, this accelerating development, as well as most theories 
of the evolution of human culture and technology, illustrate how much we depend on and cherish 
our intellectual imagination. We are only cyborgs, for better or for worse, because we imagined 
it. Haraway describes the human as a cultural product of the imperialist Western mythos, and in a 
wider context, as dynamic and ideologically variable. In the above overview of humanist 
thought, and reliance on invasive medical procedures, most critics including myself focus on a 
European and North American history. The new cyborg whom she proposes as a representative 
of human is not culturally independent. It is a  “creature of social reality as well as a creature of 
fiction” who recognizes the “racist, Male-dominated capital[istic]” understandings science and 
politics of the modern world, but chooses to subvert the boundaries of its assumptions with the 
goal of creating a less restrictive ideology (Haraway 291-2). The modern birth of fields such as 
sociology and anthropology suggests a trajectory of addressing interaction of Western ideology 
with other forms on a quickly contracting global stage. A revisiting of seminal literary works 
with greater attention to ideological interaction seems to be an appropriate extension of the 
epistemological concerns of contemporary scholarship. 
Trends in the choice of narrative mode have developed harmoniously with fluctuating 
definitions of humanity. Early literary works, such as the classical Greek and Roman epics and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Through simpler developments, like bifocal lenses and agriculture, to the advanced, like organ transplant and 
bypass surgeries, we have increased the presence of alleles for myopia (near-sightedness), asthma, and 
predisposition to cardio-vascular disease, and in turn dependence on the technology which enables us to manage 
them. One can achieve better health by pumping blood through one’s own heart patched with the choice of a bovine, 
porcine, or equine valve, by having remotely performed Lasik surgery which rebuilds the cornea or wearing 
corrective lenses, and occasionally inhaling synthetic chemicals.	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plays address the author, aided and inspired by muses, as the narrator. Through the Medieval and 
Early Modern periods, the narrator is often a character who reflects a facet of the narrator, such 
as a pining lover or the stage manager or historian of a play. In this project, I partly explore the 
more modern development of interior monologue narrative forms. This is a relatively new field 
of study, and critics disagree on whether “interior monologue” or “stream of consciousness” is 
the more narrow and specific term though most agree they are not interchangeable. Abrams 
defines interior monologue as a “species of stream of consciousness” that presents “the course 
and rhythm of consciousness precisely as it occurs in a character’s mind” (298).  He defines 
stream of consciousness as the supposedly wider term encompassing:  
“without a narrator’s intervention, the full spectrum and continuous flow of a character’s 
mental process, in which sense perceptions mingle with conscious and half-conscious 
thoughts, memories, expectations, feelings, and random associations” (298-9). 
The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, while maintaining similar definitions, and using this 
same discussion for the listings of both of these terms argues that interior monologue does not 
necessarily mix thoughts with sense perceptions and does not necessarily “violate the norms of 
grammar, syntax, and logic” while stream of consciousness narratives do (318).  
I would also argue that interior monologue is the more widely applicable and older of the 
two styles. The inclusion of the word “monologue” combined with Oxford’s argument that it 
does not betray the rules of grammar, syntax, or logic suggests literary construction. Stream of 
consciousness, first coined as psychological term in 1890, is less ordered and represents, as the 
name suggests, an uninterrupted natural current or flow. Certainly, they are not interchangeable. 
Both of the works I am exploring in this project, Poe’s “Ligeia” and Faulkner’s The Sound and 
the Fury, are written in the first person and reflective of the narrator’s thoughts, but I could not 
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characterize them together them in terms of narrative style. The text of “Ligeia” uses standard 
grammar and has a clear chronology. The first two sections of The Sound and the Fury mix 
dialogue with interior monologue as well as sensual perception during various points in the past 
and present without grammatical markers. There are generally no quotation marks and little 
indication of shift in time or speaker besides occasional italicized text. In a letter to his publisher, 
Faulkner remarked that, regrettably, printing technology had not progressed to the capability of 
printing in multiple colors and that this would be the ideal format for understanding the 
chronology (Gorra 230-1).  
These two works employ complimentary forms of interior monologue narrative 
techniques, and should share a category based on the development of these techniques in 
addressing the same subject matter. As I will discuss later, though Poe’s works fit into the Gothic 
genre and Faulkner’s works fit into the Modernist genre, they both contribute to the sub-genre of 
Southern Gothic fiction in discussing the decay of the American South by employing gothic 
tropes. Through this connection of discussing the concerns of a similar social system, these 
works lay on one continuum of a developing epistemology of the American citizen. The mid-
nineteenth century and modernist periods of American literature, called the first and second 
“American Renaissance,” reflected revolutionary developments in psychology and the nature of 
human communication and community (Patell 93). Modernity characterized its contemporary 
life as a time of a “changing sense of politics, the subject and individual…and the shifting of the 
individual and her relation to the universe” in terms of political structure, modes of production, 
and social, ontological, and epistemological understanding (Keenaghan 2014). These narratives 
provide benchmark examples of an aesthetic exploration of consciousness and the standard 
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unreliability of uninterrupted thought and contribute to an epistemological and ontological 
discussion of human perspective. 
  
Ideology and Fantasy 
Just as the human and our image of the human are both natural and crafted, so are ideology 
and the conditions of human existence surrounding that image. Marxist critics have discussed 
ideology as a “false consciousness” famously described by Louis Althusser as the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (693). All actions are motivated 
by and fit inside of an ideology, whether personal or prescribed by state, and this omnipresent 
lens prevents us from seeing the reality of our existence. 
In The Plague of Fantasies, Žižek discusses the specific relationship between ideology in 
practice and fantasy. He also insists that ideology permeates all areas of life, but in a departure 
from previous Marxist thought, he posits that ideology creates reality rather than clouding it. 
Being the only option, it provides a justification for existing social orders, but it also has 
limitations and weak points. Every action and existing object follows an ideological law, and 
since they cannot all be interpreted as strictly positive or negative, these laws are self-
antagonistic. He provides the vivid example of the practice of building monumental statues 
among continually crumbling residential structures in the Soviet Union. The statue embodies 
some culturally important value, like the dutiful citizen, but it also serves as a reminder of its 
own cost. The crumbling buildings, which have a pragmatic use as long as they still are livable, 
and the people who inhabit them serve as pedestals to the symbolic ideology of the current 
regime (2). The statue conjures both positive ideological imagery and invokes a self-destructive 
‘imp of the perverse’ type of connection with that imagery (2). An idea originally coined in 
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Poe’s philosophical short story of the same title, the imp of the perverse is the inherent impulse 
to behave in a self-destructive manner simply because one can (Poe 269). In this case, the 
perversity is not a specific criminal deviancy, but the desire to subvert the current social order. 
The sinister subtext of symbols in the Soviet Union is a somewhat obvious example of this, but 
the concept holds true for all ideologically driven actions and objects.  
The self-destructive, sinister interpretation of ideology provides a foundation for Žižek’s 
definitions of fantasy. Žižek believes that our deepest desires are unconscious, and that ideology 
creates analogous desires on the conscious level, which we can then process. He claims that 
fantasy teaches us how to desire, and how to negotiate between real objects and symbolic 
objects, and provide us with cognitive strategies with which can approach desire. The real object 
can never compare to the desired symbolic one, and the fantasy reveals more about how we want 
others to view us as objects of desire than anything else. The latter is an idealized abstract 
concept, which we project onto real objects which more or less fit its mold (8-10). For example, 
most people have an ideal image of a romantic partner in mind. In our culture, the general male 
version would be a Prince Charming figure: a handsome, strong, valiant, wealthy, emotionally 
receptive but not needy figure. Any random individual likely will not find a perfect human 
specimen; they will find someone reasonably similar to their ideal and will fill in the blanks with 
fantasy to cultivate a romantic connection.  
Because fantasy involves the act of conjuring desires, and is so revealing about personal 
attitudes, Žižek refers to it as the “primordial form” of narrative (11). For the time that one 
indulges fantasy, while reading a book or watching a film, the daily laws of ideology suspend in 
favor of fantastic ones, or at least, they seem to. The characters and objects within the fantasy 
behave in accordance with the fantastic ideology in which they exist, but the reader cannot do the 
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same. She must suspend disbelief in favor of an alternate path of logic The ideology of whatever 
fantasy captivates the reader is not necessarily new or different, but a contained subset of the 
greater ideological umbrella. This is not clear to the reader, and with each attempt to escape the 
state ideological apparatus to which the she belongs in favor of the fantastic one, the reader, or 
fantasizer, or pervert as Žižek would say, also attempts to articulate her own unconscious 
fantasies and desires. Following the earlier described principles, these desires become clearer. By 
attempting to diverge from the path, the fantasizer simply finds a different route to the same 
destination. The writer must do the same when crafting the text, as she is attempting to put into 
so many words, metaphors, and impressions, those desires which defy articulation. 
Paradoxically, the act of subverting prescribed ideology results, both for the reader and writer, in 
an amplified desire to be subjugated under that same set of rules disguised as something new. 
The pervert actually becomes a philosopher, and fantasy teaches her how to interpret desire 
through the law of ideology (8-11).  
What can we learn from Žižek’s view of fantasy? Though this is not a humanist text, it helps 
us approach general conclusions about human behavior. Humans desire to be subjugated to 
ideology, to belong to something or someone else. Or do they? As described in the earlier 
paragraphs, we have learned that we do not and cannot have an alternative. We gravitate toward 
fantasy in order to simulate escape from the omnipotence of present ideology. Fantasy, science 
fiction, and horror narratives provide perfect spaces for this. Inhabitants of the modern world 
especially enjoy thrill-seeking experiences such as sky diving and horror films in order to 
experience the rush of epinephrine our species no longer experiences sitting at desks. These 
moments of socially approved, constructed, and transient stress, sometimes referred to as 
eustress, in moderation, can contribute to a healthier physical and psychological state (Nelson & 
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Simmons). Lacan described our entire existence as “traumatic…: ‘By definition, there is 
something so improbable about all existence that one is in effect perpetually questioning oneself 
about its reality’” (Žižek 48). Our trauma lies in an irreversible inability to see past ideology into 
an independently true reality. He connects this to the idea of jouissance, an experience of 
pleasure at carnal, dangerous, almost intolerable levels experienced when a subject comes into 
contact with an ideologically incongruent point, a suggestion of independent reality, which 
shatters the self. He refers to this experience as “properly traumatic.” This experience of self-
shattering provides a glimpse of “the density of the subject’s reality” and anchors itself in a 
potentially addictive fantasy. Similarly to how exposure to the momentarily exploited laws of 
physics gives the thrill-seeker that feeling of being terrifyingly alive, “properly traumatic” 
moments rooted in fantasy give that same feeling in glimpses of snags in the ideological fabric. 
In order to create this effect intellectually, the reader must engage and challenge her 
understanding of ideology and epistemology.  
 
Theoretical Connections and the Gothic 
I believe that literature written in the first person perspective with an unconventional 
narrator, where the reader must understand all incoming information through an uncomfortably 
manipulated lens, is worth exploring. These narrators present a parallel reality: they live within 
the framework of a specific fantasy and belong to an ideology the reader views as being self-
contained and excluded from the larger social context. They are literally objectified. Though they 
are essential to their narratives, they have no immediate purpose or value outside of them. 
Because fantasy is an uncanny image of reality, not the self-contained world the reader often 
views, the act of objectifying characters within fantasy does not depart greatly from the way 
	   	   Neroni	  19 
	  
flesh and blood humans have perceived each other at certain points in history. Gothic literature, 
where the unreliable narrator is inevitably attached to themes of entrapment, haunting, and the 
shattering of norms, lends itself superbly to this type of reading. For the purpose of this paper, I 
will discuss this type of objectification and the function of the unreliable narrator in fantasy in 
relation to the ideals of the 19th Century United States as reflected in Gothic and Southern Gothic 
literature.  
 Gothic literature has persisted in popularity since its beginnings with Horace Walpole’s 
1764 The Castle of Otranto. The genre is characterized as a fusion of old and new literary 
tradition, specifically the sweeping and arabesque details of medieval and early modern 
romances and the realism of the modern novel focused on creating a pleasurable terror. Cynthia 
Marshall proposes that one of the main experiences of early modern literature lies with the allure 
of violence and pleasure of jouissance in the molding of an early modern subjectivity (Murakami 
2014). For Jerrold Hogle, the same kind of fatal attraction exists in the decaying and haunted 
spaces of the gothic. Hogle defines the most important identifying features of the gothic as an 
antiquated, aging, or decaying setting, and hidden secrets within these spaces which haunt the 
characters “psychologically, physically, or otherwise.” The narratives “oscillate between the 
earthly laws of conventional reality and the possibilities of the supernatural,” and raise “the 
possibility that the boundaries between these may [be] crossed.” Similarly to the early modern 
example, the appeal lies in violence against earthly convention. Most gothic fiction fits into one 
of the two major categories: terror gothic and horror gothic. The first focuses on the tension of 
possible danger and depends more on suspense, both in characters and readers, while the second 
“confronts the principal characters with the gross violence of physical or psychological 
dissolution, explicitly shattering the assumed norms (including the repressions) of everyday life.” 
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Hogle attributes the “longevity and power” of the genre to the “way it helps use address and 
disguise some of the most important desires, quandaries, and sources of anxiety…throughout the 
history of western culture.” The gothic allows us to project the contradictions and maladies of 
our modern condition onto “antiquated” and “anomalous” creatures and spaces. Similarly to 
Early Modernisms such as period drama films and TV shows, which almost always follow a 
compelling moment of sociopolitical change, the fantasy of the gothic provides a seemingly safe 
space where “our contradictions can by confronted by, yet removed from us” (Hogle 2-6).  
We can see how the defining details of the gothic lend themselves comfortably to an 
interpretation using Žižek’s notions of fantasy. Having grown out of the literary traditions of 
Medieval and Early Modern romance, the gothic paints its characters, specifically female 
characters, in accordance with medieval and Early Modern-esque ideals. The literary conception 
of Courtly Love, as I will discuss later at greater length, during these two eras idealized an 
unattainable romantic relationship resembling that of the feudal lord and serf. Žižek insists that 
the “masochistic theatre” of Courtly Love has unfortunately survived in contemporary ideology 
because of a “continuing male attempt to compensate for his reduction of the woman to a mere 
vehicle for his fantasy” (150). Women in gothic works tend to be ethereal and unattainable, 
separated by physical or conceptual veils and palls. They serve the narrative with more purpose 
as stock characters and “vehicles of fantasy,” to borrow Žižek’s phrase, than as dynamic 
characters. In the two works I will be focusing on, the tragedy of the plot is driven by two 
women’s failure to fit the two-dimensional fantasy of the men whom surround them, and the 
horrifying consequence of this masochistic fantasy in the men’s minds. 
 By giving the reader an affective, sensory experience of anxiety, terror, in a detached 
space, the gothic serves as a worthy vehicle for discussing antagonistic points within ideology. 
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Additionally, the air of suspense and anxiety almost presuppose a first person narrator’s 
unreliability within the narrative, detaching it further. Considering the supernatural condition of 
any gothic narrative, some duty of interpretation and testimony falls on the narrator, but any 
observation made could be dismissed as a projection of fear, stress, or the madness resulting 
from an overabundance of the two. Considering the subject matter of hauntings and ancient 
curses, no perspective in gothic tales could possibly be considered reliable or definitive. First 
person narration in the gothic demands suspension in disbelief and a complete immersion in 
fantasy, and because of an inherently unbelievable narrative, places the responsibility of 
interpretation back onto the reader rather than the narrator. Whatever obstacle or obsession the 
narrator battles in the suspended space to which Hogle refers, the reader must battle as well.  
This type of Gothic literature, though not meant to be testimony, reached the center of an 
already existing debate over the function of literature and importance of authenticity. Walpole 
published The Castle of Otranto under a pseudonym, and as the translation of a 1529 manuscript 
from Naples which recorded an even older tale dating back to the Crusades. Contemporary 
audiences and critics admired the work as a medieval romance at first, but rejected it almost 
completely when Walpole printed a second edition and admitted authorship after many other 
authors began publishing fiction intentionally paraded as lost diaries and histories. This backlash 
provides insight into how perceptions of ownership of ideas and literary authenticity have 
changed, or how they have not. While gaining recent critical popularity, the Gothic long suffered 
condemnation as being a frivolous form, in no small part because of the intentional and 
conspicuous deception. Many of today’s films and television shows are presented as truths or 
alternate universes. Many films even begin with either “based on a true story,” or “all similarities 
to real events are coincidences.” Many horror films, such as those relating to the misadventures 
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of paranormal investigators Ed and Lorraine Warren receive backlash for being allegedly “based 
on a true story,” possibly because they fuel disagreement between parties with opposing beliefs. 
Though this certainly attracted attention historically in connected with changing copyright laws 
and ideas of creative ownership, the supposition of truth in fantasy negated the desire to escape 
reality. Part of the appeal of the gothic lies in the pleasurable suspension of reality and temporary 
absorption within the world of the supernatural. The added allegation of truth challenges deeply 
seated epistemological understandings of what is real and natural and what is supernatural, and 
though this may be trivial on the surface, such a suggestion may resonate deeply with an 
audience and uncomfortably increase the intensity of a potentially properly traumatic experience. 
 More positively, viewers and readers may realize that the universes to which they devote 
so much of their time and identity are constructed, and they indulge in another small reality to 
which they can choose to grant their allegiance. Gothic spaces, for example, provide one such 
detached reality where readers can confront and explore other ideologies and points of resistance 
to the ideology of their waking life. These points, to Žižek, and earlier, Lacan, represent 
authentic truths that exist in the reality made opaque by ideology in the traditional Marxist sense. 
We cannot necessarily define such truths, but we can identify them, the “Real,” as points which 
resist full inscription into any given ideology.3 As we catch glimpses of them, like through the 
text of subversive literature and visual art, we recognize, I feel, the most profound truth that we 
can understand: that fantasy is our reality. Rather than impossibly lifting the veil from our eyes, 
points of the “Real” poke holes in the fabric and make it known that the veil exists. In the gothic, 
where these points are allowed to be discussed and indulged through impossible but “based on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The Early Modern map, cited in an earlier example, could lend itself to such an interpretation, as it was not meant 
to resist ideology, but reshaped both physical and ideological understandings of the world, as did other revision to 
“maps” such as the replacement of the Ptolemaic model of the solar system with the Copernican. We understand the 
scientific depiction of Earth’s geography and our solar system as fact, but during the Early Modern period, these 
truths subverted fundamental understandings of how “natural” political and religious ideology was.	  
	   	   Neroni	  23 
	  
true story” type scenarios and unreliable testimonies, the narrator experiences true terror having 
come into contact with the consequences of such contact, and the reader experiences a pleasing 
terror—pleasing only while that reality remains out of reach. We find these narrators and 
narratives fascinating and alluring, but the thought of existing in such a subversive environment 
creates discomfort, and if the text is convincing enough, fear or a temporary schism between 
fantasy and waking life. The experience of viewing the gothic through a first person perspective 
brings a reader to a sort of jouissance, but in a safe, fictitious environment and provokes 
discussion over the truly terrifying implications of our plague of fantasy. 
Many gothic works achieve this effect with the use of a specific format and repeated 
imagery and techniques such as: dilapidated, formerly grand buildings, a fair, innocent heroine, 
veils and shrouds, ghosts, a heavily emphasized erotic tension. Though they are effective, when 
read as a compendium, the details of distinct works bear such resemblance to one another that 
they become tired and predictable. For example, Edgar Allan Poe often received criticism over 
his short stories having to do with the death and resurrection of beautiful ladies (“Ligeia,” 
“Morella,” “Berenice,” and “The Fall of the House of Usher”) for following a seemingly 
uncreative, explicit formula. A beloved woman dies. Her insane and/or drug-addicted, certainly 
unreliable, lover cannot forget her. He fixates on one of her mysterious, enthralling physical 
features. The power of his obsession reanimates her angry corpse as the narrative comes to an 
abrupt horrific end. Even with the addition of details, the stories remain remarkably similar. But, 
this well-known and established formula allowed authors to express a multitude of ideas attached 
to the gothic tradition using subtle techniques. The themes of containment and fear, obsession 
with purity and sin, almost universal concerns in western society, paired with the threat of the 
supernatural all contained within the testimony of one obviously unhinged narrator provide a 
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perfect stage for exploring the limits of ideological logic. In Edgar Allan Poe “Ligeia,” the 
narrator goes mad from indulging his obsession, while under the influence of opiates, of 
elevating, arguably, a woman of mysterious, but mix racial background, to the ideal snow white, 
veiled gothic heroine. The ridiculous conventions of both gothic literature and western culture 
fall as the spectre of the narrators love fails to conform to them, and in depicting her monstrosity, 
Poe reveals how fragile these conventions are. And, in an explicit manner, Poe’s narrator 
experiences the consequence of indulging too deeply into fantasy. Lady Ligeia’s eyes, those 
which he had cherished and dreamed to understand, become the only feature of the horrific ghost 
which he can recognize. Upon completing the story, it seems that the troubled narrator brought 
Ligeia’s wrath upon himself, but we never learn what that entails. The most logical assumption is 
that the narrator maybe indulged in too much opium, in which case, his amplified desires created 
the ghostly terrifying Ligeia, and maybe his memory of the flesh and blood Ligeia. For him, she 
was the perfect woman, and much like the historic ideals of the knight in shining armor or Prince 
Charming, the definition of female perfection was largely dictated by the narrator’s historical 
moment and a Southern American appropriation of Courtly Love rhetoric. A thorough reading of 
“Ligeia” necessitates a discussion of what that ideal was and how the narrator’s interpretation 
compared. In some more recent research models regarding the unreliable narrator, establishing 
unreliable narration requires a reader who recognizes a dichotomy between the narrator’s 
perceptions and expressions and those of the implied author and historical moment. For this 
structure to work, since a reader needs to be able to identify a meaningful ideological difference 
between narrator and author perception, an author must be aware of the ideological schema in 
which his audience exists and build the narrator and his unreliability accordingly (Nunning 100). 
Likewise, the reader must recognize the ideological schema present in any given work.  In Poe’s 
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case, the narrators often begin, and pepper generously, their monologues with admissions of 
opiate use and failing sanity because of said drug use. Their unreliability depends on a public’s 
negative association between drug use and reliability as a functional citizen as well as the well-
traversed tropes of gothic literature. By setting a predictable, formulaic stage, the narrator’s 
unconventionality takes a back seat to the importance of what he describes. 
 In the case of Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, which I will also discuss later in this 
project, the reader must contend with a highly unconventional narrator of a different nature. The 
story of the Compson family falls into both the genres of modernist novel and southern gothic 
novel. The southern gothic depicts the social decay of the southern United States with focus on 
classic gothic themes such as derelict and decaying physical and psychological settings, and 
themes of alienation and containment (Flora 313). For Benjy Compson, who suffers from severe 
mental retardation, past and present flow together continuously in a stream of associations 
through touch, sight, smell, and verbal cues. Instead of depending on interpretive details in 
content, Faulkner conveys Benjy’s unreliability through aesthetic presentation of text. He 
intentionally abandons punctuation and other stylistic rules, writes in mixed standard and italic 
text, and changes speakers mid-paragraph or even mid-clause within a sentence. For Faulkner, 
this was an aesthetic experiment meant to explore Macbeth’s existential cry that “life’s but a 
walking shadow…a tale/ Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/ Signifying nothing” 
(Shakespeare 5.5) paired with contemporary developing understandings of psychology.  
Certainly, the text explores that question of the significance of individual experience of 
life: each of the Compsons feels differently about the decay of their noble family. But this 
difficult narrative style also brings up our epistemological assumption of how time flows and 
affects the mind. Benjy’s impressionist painting of time seems surreal to the average reader, and 
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this is the primary source of difficulty in his section. But, the linear scientific view of time is 
ideologically determined. We view time as a stable variable moving along an axis in finite 
quantities, like integers on a number line. Benjy, however, views time as a cloud in which he is 
enveloped. The past and present lie before him, and he connects the different points of each 
through categories of sensation, and the future lies somewhere outside the field of perception. I 
call his narration unconventional rather than unreliable because, quite remarkably, Benjy shares 
his definition of time with several Pre-Columbian civilizations including the Inca. The Inca 
viewed the past and present as existing on the same, easily accessible, plane lying in front of 
them because they had knowledge of it, and the future lurked behind them but was ever-
approaching and shocking (D’Altroy 131-2). Suddenly, Benjy’s point of view makes more sense. 
Benjy’s brothers, Quentin and Jason, also reveal unreliability. Their narrative portions are deeply 
affected, as is Benjy’s, by their impressions of their sister Caddy and her independence and 
rebellion against contemporary expectations of women. The final narrative section concerns 
Dilsey Gibson, the matriarch of the African American family who tend to the Compsons. 
Strikingly, Dilsey’s narrative betrays no such unreliability. Not having subscribed to the popular 
ideology of Aristocratic Southern families, like the Compson’s, they were unaffected by Caddy’s 
rebellion and positively affected by the huge epistemological shift after the Civil War. Not only 
does the complex interaction of ideological shift with members of different social strata, it 
provides an alternative, more omniscient and complete, portrayal of the Compson timeline. 
At the conclusion of his survey, Nünning suggests a direction of research focused on how 
authors use the unreliable narrator to “reflect or respond to changing cultural discourses” 
(Nünning 105). In the extreme case of William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, the reader 
must look past our most basic understandings of language, perspective and temporality to follow 
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the decay of one aristocratic family unable to let go of the same antiquated system of ideology 
with which Poe’s narrator struggled juxtaposed with the emergence of a new system from which 
others, like Dilsey’s family, benefit. These variable perspectives’ social functions dovetail 
comfortably into Žižek’s understanding of the “Real” and its role in the relationship between 
fantasy and ideology. As we begin to question what we hold to be essential truths, like time, we 
can begin to interpret unconventional narrators as intentional and essential mediators between the 
bit of the “Real”—the fact that what we have is a single perspective, and that others exist—
revealed in their unconventional narration, and the ideological compliance of the implied author 
and reader. After all, a common “tell” of an unreliable narrator is revelation of personal 
idiosyncrasies or contradictions to the norms of the narrative through strong feeling or opinion. 
Through recognizing idiosyncrasies and behavioral patterns, we recognize our own and begin to 
depart from the paranoid reading of normativity. Through this immersion, the reader can view 
widened points of inconsistency with normativity as different interpretations of a subjective 
reality rather than distortions of truth. It is then that we can begin to step beside ourselves. 
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Part II: Perverse Readings in Poe 
 Though revered as one of the first great American authors—a copy of his first book, 
Tamerlane and Other Poems, sold for a record $662,500 at Christie’s, NY—Edgar Allan Poe 
still occupies the popular and critical imagination as an unsung genius, and a tortured artist often 
conflated with his tortured characters. The repeated tales of madness, premature burial, and the 
untimely death and haunting of beautiful women supposedly point to a mind abused and 
traumatized by deaths of female family members, substance abuse, and fear. In reality, Poe was a 
meticulous and erudite writer, literary critic, and entrepreneur. He created his works with an 
intense mindfulness of aesthetics, the issues of contemporary print culture, and the interactive 
nature of reading. These were certainly self-therapy exercises. By combining formulaic tropes of 
the gothic tale with the sensationalist themes and rhetoric popular in southern antebellum print 
culture, Poe created “commercially desirable” literary environments. But through nuanced detail 
and technique, these seemingly simple or purely aesthetic works direct attention to problematic 
aspects of the culture of the intended readership.  
“Ligeia,” is one such short story that is often read within the context of series of several 
stories all concerning an “insane, drugged, or deranged” narrator’s retelling of the death of a 
beautiful woman, what Poe states is “unquestionably, the most poetical topic in the world” in his 
“Philosophy of Composition” (Levine 62). The basic narrative and tone of each story is so 
remarkably similar, that the stories make for unremarkable and repetitive leisure reading. But, 
one can argue that Poe, by using the same framework for a handful of short, contained works, 
creates a set of experiments exploring individual variables in the form of cultural conceptions of 
human relationships and vitality. This particular work follows the interior monologue of a single 
narrator, as he describes his doomed marriages while under the influence of opium. In the first 
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half, he eulogizes his first wife, Ligeia, and retells the story of her illness and passing. In the 
second half, he experiences a catastrophic haunting where the enchanting Ligeia possesses the 
body of the narrator’s second wife, Rowena, who is ill and on the brink of death during the 
moment of the narrative. In this work, which Poe often named his best, the narrator’s 
misrepresentative description of his first wife and their relationship underlines the wider racial 
anxiety buried beneath contemporary conceptions of the social structure of the antebellum 
American South. In conducting a historically sensitive reading, the reader can cultivate strategies 
for approaching the implications of one’s own, and others’ epistemologies, by first working 
through understanding the value of one “unreliable” perspective.   
In the processes of mourning his first wife, the unnamed narrator imagines her 
embodying the ideal Southern lady, but from the beginning of the narrative, the surrounding text 
struggles to support this comparison. Some scholars suggest that the narrator’s description of his 
wife, when placed in its proper historical context, signals her unrecognized mixed race 
background. Both in moral rhetoric and in unrelated popular literature in the antebellum South, 
the Southern lady was a white, ethereal, almost saintly figure and often stood in stark contrast to 
the African slave who was understood to be more ape than human. Poe arguably taps into this 
racial anxiety in “Murders in the Rue Morgue.” The Sherlockian detective, Monsieur C. Auguste 
Dupin solves a confounding “locked-room mystery” by identifying the perpetrator of the vicious 
and fatal attack on two white women who lived alone as an “Ourang-Outang” without any 
rational evidence.  In “Approaches to Teaching Poe’s Prose and Poetry,” Leonard Cassuto 
interprets the orangutan as “not just an ape,” but as a “fraught symbol of sexually charged racial 
anxiety” stemming from the contemporary belief in polygenesis (37, Person 147). Phenotypic 
difference in humans was accounted for by classification of races as different species, and “the 
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Negro [and Native Americans to a lesser extent] and Orang do afford the points where man and 
the brute…most nearly approach each other (Wyman 457)” (Person 149). This interpretation of 
the African man as a beast necessarily qualified the opposite type of person, the white American 
woman, as the angelic ideal Southern lady. Problematically, this stark contrast fails to provide an 
explanation or categorization for any person on the vast spectrum of humans in between the two. 
The narrator insists on eulogizing his wife as the angelic figure, but fails to recognize that she 
does not fit this mold. More importantly, this narrator fails to recognize the inherent self-
antagonism and problematic inconsistency of the ideological fantasy he is attempting to uphold. 
In the surreal setting of the gothic, Ligeia’s haunting and possession of the fair Rowena 
represents the grotesque reality of what he so intensely tries to conflate: antiquated, simplistic 
popular fantasy and socially complex reality. 
Joan Dayan introduces this concept in “Amorous Bondage: Poe, Ladies, and Slaves” 
through an 1850 passage from a pro-slavery pamphlet by George Fitzhugh:  
“A state of dependence is the only condition in which reciprocal affection can 
exist among human beings…A man loves his children because they are weak, 
helpless and dependent. He loves his wife for similar reasons. When his children 
grow up and assert their independence, he is apt to transfer his affection to his 
grand-children. He ceases to love his wife when she becomes masculine or 
rebellious; but slaves are always dependent, never the rivals of their master” 
(Dayan 241). 
Though the passage characterizes a wife’s devotion as limited with the word “when,” 
masculinity and rebellion were not expected or encouraged trajectories, and Dayan’s only 
mention of them comes in quoting James Kirke Paulding’s condemnation of “women 
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abolitionists who have ‘prostituted’ themselves by ‘assuming the character of a man’” (Dayan 
242). More importantly, this passage begins a discussion of how the morality of slavery 
connected to patriarchal familial values. Dayan later relates this to Poe’s review of Paulding’s 
Slavery in the United States in which he intends to “describe the ‘essential’ negro.” Though not 
clearly identifying as either pro or anti-slavery, Poe, exploiting the enormous popularity of pro-
slavery sensationalism describing that, like a good wife, “the enslaved want to be mastered, for 
they love…to serve, to be subservient,” and that this love is reflected in that one “own[s] what 
[he] loves” (emphasis mine). More importantly, he exalts this relationship above that which is 
possible between two individuals of the same race. He suggests that “habitual” use of 
“appropriate[ed]” affectionate language, specifically the endearing “my” indoctrinates the slave-
owner from an early age to understand a slave as property because, much like in marriage, love 
creates a binding contract: you do not simply love what you own; “you own what you love” 
(Dayan 241-242). 
This defense of slavery, along with many others, supports a system of servitude not 
unlike the European feudal system where the serf takes a marriage-like Oath of Fealty to “be true 
and faithful, and love all which he loves and shun all which he shuns according to the laws of 
God and the order of the world” (Stearns 103). Since the Middle Ages, we have advanced our 
understandings of the human and abandoned the idea of the sacred Great Chain of Being for a 
more scientific and entropic model of the universe. But still, this feudal rhetoric remains, and 
factored heavily into idea of amorous bondage, and subsequently the idea of love, in the 
antebellum American South. The feudal language of love and servitude substantially influenced 
the literary conception of Courtly Love, a reverent love bestowed on a superior lady, often a 
Petrarchan mistress, addressed as a lord, by a man who is socially unworthy or inappropriate for 
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her, self-addressed as a vassal, in the Medieval and Early Modern eras. It is “a love at once illicit 
and morally elevating, passionate and disciplined, humiliating and exalting, human and 
transcendent” (Newman vii).  
Strikingly, in these fantasies, the woman figures as the lord, the man as the servant, but, 
with the partial exception of admiring a member of the female nobility, the social reality 
obviously contradicted this order. Though women could technically own land and act as 
independent agents, such Wife of Bath-type characters were of the vast minority. Women were 
expected to be either angels of the homestead, blessed bearers of heirs, or brides of the lord. 
Courtly love allowed a form of expression of love outside the proper social conventions 
surrounding marriage and subversively transferred the means of salvation and the worthiness of 
suffering from trappings of the cloth to the hands of seemingly un-requitable love. Thus 
literature elevated the feminine to the transcendent while women more realistically enacted the 
role of loving servant. But, as Žižek, Lacan, and other theorists have pointed out, the courtly 
Lady is anything but angelic. She is angelic and supposedly pure because she is impermeable to 
the narrator’s love. Really, she is cold, cruel, unattainable—an abstract form of something 
womanly, and more importantly, forbidden, but she is no woman. The image of the ideal 
Southern lady only extends the surface of this tradition: the Southern lady serves the male 
fantasy as a proper, faithful servant in the form of a fair, pure, in moral character and blood, 
beautiful, and devoted wife. The means of salvation transition, once again, from un-requitable 
love to reciprocal love dependent on bondage, and in this way, the masochistic theatre of courtly 
love becomes hidden. Controversially, this line of reasoning places both the theoretical ideal lady 
and the ideal slave in the single position of loving servant (this is incongruent with courtly love 
rhetoric) and leaves the master in a questionable, simultaneously dominant and submissive, 
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position. He, and the pronoun must be “he,” supposedly owns and exercises mastery over both 
wife and slave. Both are versions of the same servant, but somehow occupy the opposite roles of 
beast of burden and angelic bearer of salvation. Importantly, both are subjugated through a 
fundamental objectification and dehumanization, whether it is in the direction of “mud” or 
“spirit,” “utmost carnality” or “absolute ideality” (Dayan 243). Poe’s Lady Ligeia, 
problematically, inhabits and surpasses both of these inhuman spheres in the narrator’s mind, but 
is too complex to be distilled into a two-dimensional spirit. In his continued effort to sustain this 
unsustainable ideologically driven fantasy, the narrator transforms his wife from human to gothic 
monster. 
Poe’s narrator, though it is not all that he treasures, goes to great lengths in describing 
Ligeia’s physicality, especially her face, and creates these images from a store of memories of 
their interaction. Importantly, the courtly lady does not exist in flesh within the text of courtly 
poetry. The poet never approaches her directly, and her physical presence generally embodied 
the female ideal of the time: slender, fair skinned, blonde, light eyes—in short, angelic. The poet 
may focus on these key features, but courtly poetry generally does not dwell on the physical 
body. In “Ligeia,” the reader receives a detailed inventory that gives the impression of a great 
beauty, but not of a fair European one, and certainly not the image of a Southern belle. We first 
learn that she possesses a “singular yet placid cast of beauty” and “enthralling…low musical 
language” (79). She is tall and slender, “even emaciated,” light of step so that she “came and 
departed as a shadow,” and “marble” skin. The beauty of her face held the sensual “radiance of 
an opium-dream,” but holds an interesting “strangeness of proportion:” 
“I examined the contour of the lofty and pale forehead—it was faultless—how cold 
indeed that word when applied to a majesty so divine!—the skin rivaling the purest ivory, 
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the commanding extent and repose, the gentle prominence of the regions above the 
temples; and then the raven-black, the glossy, the luxuriant and naturally-curling tresses, 
setting forth the full force of the Homeric epithet, “hyacinthine!” I looked at the delicate 
outlines of the nose—and nowhere but in the graceful medallions of the Hebrews had I 
beheld a similar perfection. There were the same luxurious smoothness of surface, the 
same scarcely perceptible tendency to the aquiline, the same harmoniously curved 
nostrils speaking the free spirit. I regarded the sweet mouth. Here was indeed the triumph 
of all things heavenly—the magnificent turn of the short upper lip—the soft, voluptuous 
slumber of the under—the dimples which sported, and the colour which spoke—the teeth 
glancing back, with a brilliancy almost startling, every ray of the holy light which fell 
upon them in her serene and placid yet most exultingly radiant of all smiles…And then I 
peered into the large eyes of Ligeia. 
 For eyes we have no models in the remotely antique. It might have been, too, that 
in these eyes of my beloved lay the secret to which Lord Verulam alludes. They were, I 
must believe, far larger than the ordinary eyes of our own race. They were even fuller 
than the fullest of the gazelle eyes of the tribe of the valley of Nourjahad” (80). 
This description overflows with passionate and sensual love, and the narrator’s precise memory 
of all of Ligeia’s facial features is impressive and touching. But, this is not where the story 
begins. In the opening lines, the narrator states: “I cannot, for my soul remember how, when, or 
even precisely where, I first became acquainted with the Lady Ligeia” and “I have never known 
the paternal name of her who was my friend and my betrothed.” He only remembers that they 
met “in some large, old, decaying city near the Rhine,” and that her family is “of a remotely 
ancient date” undoubtedly. He considers a few possible explanations: that resisting the urge to 
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inquire about his wife’s past was some “test of [his] strength of affection” or a simple slip in 
memory (79). But, upon reading the above description which comes next, the reader may find 
this lack of basic knowledge, and the explanations for it, unbelievable. How can a husband not 
know his wife’s maiden name? The above quoted section suggests that the narrator spent many 
days gazing at his wife, observing how rays of light shone on her from various angles during 
expression of different emotions. His memory of her face reads like the description of a painting, 
a study of classical beauty and proportion, of baroque contrast between light and shadow, and of 
the masterful technique required to translate this to a visual medium. The description that follows 
addresses her vast knowledge and the countless times the narrator eagerly learns from her. And 
yet, he never learns her name. Perhaps this was because of the same reason that we never learn 
his name: he chooses not to share.  
Joan Dayan addresses this passage as a key moment in unlocking some of the secrets of 
Ligeia’s identity. The narrator describes his wife as all of the beauties of Ancient Greece, 
alluding to Homer and Cleomenes, the sculptor of the Venus of Medici, the Middle 
Eastern/North African Nourjahad, the Houri, the virgins who greet one at the gates of paradise in 
the Muslim faith, but he never alludes to Christian Aryan beauty. He later talks of Ligeia’s vast 
store of knowledge, including knowledge of the occult and “deep proficien[cy]” in classical and 
European languages (81). Dayan argues that Ligeia, in the way the narrator objectifies her and 
fixates on her, “becomes the site for a crisis of racial identity” (260). This concern is not isolated 
to this work. Critics have interpreted part of the horrific incestuous relationship between 
Madeline and Roderick in “The Fall of the House of Usher” as having a moral basis. All 
members of the house Usher “lay in the direct line of descent” because of a very real societal fear 
of contaminating blood with blackness. The twins’ “cadaverousness of complexion,” and poor 
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health were consequences of inbreeding (Poe 89-90). In the description of Ligeia’s, Poe uses the 
same descriptors as did taxonomists of color in the Caribbean and the South. Her natural “glossy 
ringlets of…raven hair,” her large and expressive eyes, “like those of the sensuous Creole 
beauties,” her full “slumber[ing]” lower lip, and her status as a polyglot all indicate a mixed 
ethnic heritage. The narrator even says that her eyes are “far larger than the ordinary eyes of our 
own race” and likens them to those of MENA beauties. Furthermore, Ligeia’s “ivory” or 
“marble” skin is suspect. The obsession with purity of blood bred a pseudo-scientific fascination 
with detecting “black blood in lightened skin.” Whiteness tainted by black blood was “less 
animated…white but pale or closer to yellow, with a tint ranging from grayish yellow to 
yellowish white like ivory [or marble].” Perhaps the narrator never learned his wife’s name 
because she did not want to subject herself to the structural violence and slave owner fantasy 
directed at the “tragic mulatta” or “octoroon mistress” (260-2, see Appendix A). Her sensual, and 
controversial “tragic mulatta” beauty makes Ligeia a shockingly subversive and incompatible 
choice for an embodiment of the ideal Southern lady.  
Furthermore, though, as the white man and husband, the narrator should be the dominant 
partner in this marriage, Ligeia seems to carry more power and prestige. The ideal wife should be 
a limb of the husband: she should concern herself only with devotion to her husband and the 
home he makes for her. Instead, the narrator concerns himself with all that was Ligeia because, 
even in death, she is such a commanding presence. Her powerful vitality and financial position 
alone would catapult her into masculine territory if she were to be evaluated by Fitzhugh. 
Beyond holding the majority of the monetary wealth in the marriage which makes the purchasing 
of the narrator’s arabesque chamber possible, Ligeia does not exhibit the virtues of a 
homemaker. The narrator tells, “I have spoken of the learning of Ligeia; it was immense—such 
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as I have never known in woman.” Not only is she a polyglot, as stated before, but she is also 
learned in physical science, mathematics, moral philosophy, and poetry. “Where breathes the 
man who has traversed, and successfully, all of the wide areas” which she has mastered, the 
narrator asks. The narrator, importantly, compares her and identifies her as intellectually superior 
not only to all other women, but also to all men. He characterizes her as the complete opposite of 
what Fitzhugh conceives as the ideal wife.  In “Poe and the Theme of Forbidden Knowledge,” 
Jules Zanger posits that Ligeia and her mysterious knowledge embody the complete antithesis to 
the ideal wife: the oldest sin attributed to women. Having grouped together Poe’s short stories 
concerning dying women with “Descent into the Maelstrom,” Zanger identifies the women, 
including Ligeia, as “personifications of great, impersonal natural forces” by which the men find 
themselves “engulfed and destroyed” in pursuit of forbidden knowledge. Ligeia’s eyes draw our 
narrator in like the maelstrom or the eyes of a storm as a pathway to an unknown world.  
Zanger extends this argument to conclude that the women represent an “engulfing sexual 
force” that reveals some secret sin in the male narrators. While I would support that the 
narrator’s love toward Ligeia seems obsessive and approaching perversity or sin, I do not think 
that it is so essentially carnal and predatory. When combined with this idea an engulfing natural 
force, our lady’s mysteriously vast knowledge, likeness to classical Greek and Hebrew beauties, 
and eventual resurrection suggests an image similar to Eve holding the apple to Adam or Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti’s “Proserpina” (see Appendix B). The subject in the painting, though sensual 
and beautiful, is, more compellingly, strong, holding the forbidden fruit out of which she has 
taken a bit, and is focused on something out of view of the audience. Certainly, this woman does 
not look weak and subservient. As one wonders when viewing this painting, the narrator desires 
to understand his wife’s thoughts. After recounting her baffling intellect, he admits her 
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supremacy and “resign[ed himself]…to her guidance through the chaotic world of metaphysical 
investigation” (82). Though he says he resigned himself “with child-like confidence,” his 
motivation seems much more adult. He describes being her student: 
“With how vast a triumph—with how vivid a delight—with how much of all that is 
ethereal in hope—did I feel, as she bent over me in studies but little sought—but less 
known—that delicious vista by slow degrees expanding before me, down whose long, 
gorgeous, and all untrodden path, I might at length pass onward to the goal of a wisdom 
too divinely precious not to be forbidden” (82)! 
One can see how Zanger reached the conclusion that the narrator’s motivation lies in Ligeia’s 
sexuality. But, as gathered from the previous descriptions of her, the narrator desires her equally 
for her body, mind, and soul. She is, after all, the ideal, and this narrative is an elegy, as the 
narrator follows this quote directly with a lament of how empty and lost he felt as his wife grew 
weak and ill. What he remembers in such vivid, sensual terms is the jouissance, the painful eager 
pleasure he felt in having the most perfect, inspiring muse, one who “conflates knowledge and 
carnality and shows…domination in both areas” (Weekes 158). Still, importantly, this role does 
not align with any of the virtues of a Southern Lady, and is thrust upon the image of Ligeia by 
the narrator.  
 In “Poe’s Feminine Ideal,” Karen Weekes proposes that Ligeia is meant to embody a 
different ideal. Instead of serving as the ideal Southern Lady, she represents the narrator’s, and 
by extension, Poe’s “incarnation of feminine perfection,” and “Poe’s own version of Madeline 
Usher: his haunting, beautiful twin” (158; 160). Weekes, and other critics, apply this argument 
specifically to Ligeia because of a possible resemblance to Poe’s own pale skin, raven hair, and 
striking intelligence.  While this conflation of narrator and author is problematic, the idea of 
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Ligeia as the feminine half of the narrator merits a deeper investigation. Certainly, she seems too 
perfect. When finally recounting her death, the narrator says that, from her death bed, Ligeia 
showered him with “the overflowing of a heart whose more than passionate devotion amounted 
to idolatry” (82), and revels in her “idolatrous love” after her death (84). The surrounding text 
does not support this, and we never adopt Ligeia’s own perspective. The only reference to her 
speech manifests as the narrator retelling how she soothed his impending grief while on her 
deathbed. This is hardly a representative sample, and this moment would certainly be wrought 
with emotion and an “overflowing of a heart.” Ligeia’s only possible direct manifestation in the 
narrative comes when she inhabits Rowena’s body and rises to haunt the narrator.  
Even then, the narrator admits, several times, to opium use. All of the events of the 
narrative that happen closer to the point of composition, during the demise of Lady Rowena, who 
fits the ideal Southern lady mold quite well, but produces no passion in the narrator, become 
increasingly surreal as a possible consequence of opium use. Ligeia could very well be imagined, 
and her haunting a manifestation of the narrator’s will being strong enough to conquer death, as 
The Conqueror Worm poem suggests is possible. Even if she was a living woman, she has 
already died by the beginning of the narrative, so all impressions of her are imagined. If so, one 
must consider that this belief and poem were Ligeia’s teachings. She read this poem to her 
husband on her deathbed to bring him comfort. From here, if we maintain that Ligeia is an 
incarnation of the narrator, her haunting in the final lines of the story are also imagined. Instead 
of exercising the power of will over death, the narrator is really enthralled by his own fantasy. 
Un-embodied, Ligeia serves as his courtly lady, his idolatrous wife, his angel, and his servant, 
and his obsession becomes even more compelling if this wife does not exist.  
	   	   Neroni	  40 
	  
In the introduction to Žižek’s “Courtly Love, or Woman as Thing” Elizabeth and 
Edmund Wright state that “the survival of the courtly love structure testifies to the continuing 
male attempt to compensate for his reduction of the woman to a mere vehicle for his fantasy” 
(150). This type of fantasy deprives both the woman of “her own particularity as woman” and 
adds a sado-masochistic element to the relationship in question. In Poe’s construction of this 
theatre through an un-embodied narrator and his un-embodied ideal partner, the sad-masochism 
unravels into horror. As it borrows the language of feudalism, courtly love enacts the lord-
bondsman relationship. As earlier mentioned, the lady serves as the lord, her lover the servant. I 
discussed earlier that the Southern antebellum tessellation of this conception switched the two 
roles, or at least attempted to. The ideal Southern lady is not the cold, cruel Petrarchan mistress 
who makes unreal demands of her lover. She is, instead, a humble servant to her husband. 
Really, as the narrator’s unintentional language that “speaks of emasculation” at the hands of a 
fantasy shows, the humble servant is the dominant party in the relationship.  
Hegel describes this type of relationship, the lord and bondsman, as a dialectic between 
two self-conscious beings essentially involving the motion of recognition. As one self-conscious 
being exerts dominance over the other, they allow each other to assume the positions of master 
and servant. Importantly, the beings must recognize each other, and not themselves. Like any 
other ideological structure, this dialectic is self-antagonistic: if the parties do not agree on their 
hierarchy, the structure falls apart. As I discussed earlier, the narrator should, by all accounts, be 
the dominant figure in his marriage to Ligeia, doubly so during the time of the narrative when 
she is a fantasy. Her haunting and the narrator’s obsessive elegy beg to differ. When viewing 
their marriage as an intended lord-bondsman structure, one can begin to see why. In Hegel’s 
dialectic, the master’s title of “master” depends on recognition from the servant. Thus, in this 
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short story, the narrator’s dominance in his relationship depends on Ligeia’s allowance of this. 
He insists she loved him to the point of idolatry, but he gives no evidence of this. Even if his 
perspective is reliable, that she did idolize him, he admits that Ligeia was intellectually superior 
and enchanting not only to him, but to all men. She is so enchanting that, in fact, when she exists 
only as a figment of his imagination, he is completely enthralled and physically haunted.  
In struggling to conflate his wife, an incredibly complex character, with this stagnant 
courtly ideal Southern lady fantasy, he strips her not of her particularity as a woman, but her 
humanity. Within the macabre setting of the gothic bedchamber decorated with sarcophagi, the 
assumption of dreariness due to drugs, and a second dying woman located in the home belonging 
to the deceased, Lady Ligeia, now stripped of humanity tortures her husband. But, she is not to 
blame. Even though the narrative grows more gothic and surreal as it progresses, there is no 
indication that the dead have any agency. The narrator holds responsibility for the creation of his 
wife’s image, and thus holds responsibility for transforming her into the beautiful monster in 
most readers’ imaginations (see Appendix C). When read with historical moment in mind, the 
narrator’s imagining of his wife as the contemporary ideal seems like the highest compliment. 
With the aid of the gothic’s simultaneous realism and surrealism, Poe shows through his narrator 
that even positive ideological conceptions can be dangerous. The narrator’s lack of 
understanding of his own narrative, though difficult to dissect, reflects the larger societal lack of 
understanding of the limits of ideology. Misunderstanding conceptions and allegories as 
equivalent to reality and applicable to individual leads to possibly horrific dehumanization, 
whether it be in the direction of mud or spirit. As I will discuss in the next section, this can hold 
serious consequences. In this example, Ligeia’s failure to conform to an antiquated and 
	   	   Neroni	  42 
	  
paradoxical ideal only claimed one soul lost in fantasy in some ancient city by the Rhine. In 
William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, the stakes are much higher. 
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Part III: In the Time of the Compsons 
 In a 1931 introduction to The Sound and the Fury, Richard Hughes writes that he would 
“not attempt to give either a summary or an explanation of it: for if [he] could say in three pages 
what takes Mr. Faulkner three hundred there would obviously be no need for the book” (223). 
Indeed, the novel, like many great works of art, explores that which cannot be explained, defined 
or quantified: the tragic inevitability of time. In fact, Faulkner said of this novel: “I wrote this 
book and learned to read” (25). Originally inspired by the vision of Candace “Caddy” Compson 
climbing up a blossoming pear tree in her soiled drawers to sneak a peak at a funeral as her 
brothers watched, the novel transformed into an unplanned tour de force and is still a fascinating 
subject of academic inquiry. Through writing Benjy’s almost incomprehensible, but truthful, 
account of the final decades of the Old Compson Place, Faulkner perhaps learned the potential a 
narrative’s power, regardless of intent, to move an audience. Though Faulkner did not have a 
definite plan for this novel, and though Benjy never intends to create an argument or illustrate a 
point, his striking narrative, and the other narrators’ clarifying contributions, encapsulates the 
tragedy of what Faulkner calls the “old since dead” postbellum American South. The narrators’ 
unwavering faith in the integrity of their narratives provides a compelling glance at their 
ideologically driven source of their assumptions and their failure to endure.  
 Before conducting a close reading of The Sound and the Fury, one must consider the 
historical and aesthetic moment both depicted and surrounding the work. First, the novel is an 
experiment in, and is often cited as an example of mastery of, the style of stream of 
consciousness narrative as much as it is a work of Southern Gothic fiction. Faulkner has the 
advantage of being able to reflect on the effect of the Civil War on the South, and the way in 
which ideologies such as Fitzhugh’s have failed. In a draft of the introduction to the 1933 edition 
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of The Sound and the Fury, Faulkner both “escapes” and “indicts” the mythos of the now dead 
South while trying to capture it (254). As C. Vann Woodward and Richard J. Gray summarize, 
the South possesses a different mythos from the rest of the United States. Woodward explains the 
continuing American belief of invincibility and “Manifest Destiny” as a product of the nation’s 
never having faced major military defeat. The American Dream of immigrating, conquering, and 
flourishing still exists, especially in proud historically successful and politically active cities such 
as New York and Chicago, which Faulkner insists are still vital and alive (Woodward 285). The 
South, however sharing the greater pretensions of the rest of nation does not recognize “history 
[as] something unpleasant that happens to other people.” “Unlike the rest of the nation,” Gray 
writes, “the South had had the stunning experience of military defeat and occupation” during and 
after the Civil War (286). The South shares, with the rest of the world, the feeling of a whole 
generation of young men being either “wiped out” or being “effectively paralysed.” The men of 
the American South who lived through or had memory of the aftershock and occupation of the 
Civil War found it “impossible…to function as anything more than ‘shadows’” as “time had 
become frozen” and left them “moving among the living as ghosts” (286-7).  
Faulkner sums up this sentiment perfectly with the famous allusion to Macbeth in the 
title: 
 Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
 That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
 And then is heard no more: it is a tale 
 Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
 Signifying nothing (Shakespeare 5.5 2381-85). 
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This carefully chosen title serves as a moment of connection between the traumatized post-war 
generation of the South and the vast global history of defeat. The young men of Faulkner’s novel 
cry out in their narratives the stream of consciousness, the whole of their impressions, attached to 
their paralyzed imaginations. The Compson men, representative of the post-war generation of a 
noble Southern aristocratic family, fixate especially on the same problematic female ideal that 
tortured Poe’s narrator in “Ligeia.” But, instead of manifesting as an unbelievable and surreal 
haunting, the gothic horror in Faulkner’s work remains contained to the psychological well 
being, or lack thereof, of the narrators centered around the same obsession with grafting the 
image of the ethereal, ideal Southern lady onto a woman who treads on the ground. Their 
seeming unreliability fades as it informs the reader of the anguish of the, then, newly dead South. 
In “On The Sound and the Fury: Time in the Work of Faulkner,” Jean-Paul Sartre insists 
that “man’s misfortune lies in his being time-bound” (317). The Compsons, he insists are stuck 
in the past as displayed by Faulkner’s choice to write all of his narrators’ thoughts as past. Even 
in passages that seemingly address the present, or occur in the present, like Quentin’s long 
monologue, arguably exist as past. Sartre insists that Quentin’s suicide is not a possibility, and 
therefore not a future, but an already determined event. He dismantles his watch and speaks out 
of time in preparation for the inevitable. After this careful analysis, Sartre concludes that though 
he “like[s] his art,” he does not believe in his metaphysics as he has interpreted them. To him, 
Faulkner’s work represents an aesthetic expression of a cataclysmic, closed future, the non-future 
of “a world dying of old age” (323). Though I think Sartre’s analysis is sound, and gives 
excellent insight to the function of time in this novel, I believe that his metaphysical approach 
ignores the ideological conditions and causes of this Compson tragedy. These narrators not only 
embody a confusing and jarring perspective in experiencing time as either static or traumatic, 
	   	   Neroni	  46 
	  
they pair this experience with a static ideological state. Half of the trauma of defeat belongs to 
the loss and replacement of ideology and an upheaval of social hierarchy. When considering this 
post-war trauma, the inevitability of time is just as important as the institutions it has eroded. 
 It is important, first, to establish the narrators and the Compson family within their social 
context. In the later published “Appendix: Compson: 1699-1945” within The Portable Faulkner 
anthology, Faulkner provides a complete genealogy of the Compson family’s arrival to the 
United States, rise to power, and eventual decay. Quentin MacLachan, first of his name, son of a 
Glasgow printer, fled Scotland after having fought against the English crown to the Carolinas, 
and fled once again, not wanting to be on the losing side of another battle, to Daniel Boone’s 
Kentucky with his grandson. His son, Charles Stuart, a loyalist during the American Revolution 
stole his father’s claymore to fight, but was “left for dead in a Georgia swamp by his own 
retreating army and then by the advancing American one, both of which were wrong” (Faulkner 
705). For a short time after that, Charles attempted to live out his days as a schoolteacher, but 
became “the gambler he actually was and which no Compson seemed to realize they all were” 
and joined a Confederate plot to secede the whole of the Mississippi Valley from the Union and 
join it to Spain. After the failure of this movement, he burned all bridges with his co-conspirators 
and fled, “running true to family tradition, with his son and the old claymore and tartan” (706).  
His son, Jason Lycurgus, made a name for himself by racing against, and winning horses 
from, the Chickasaw tribe that had recently become dispossessed during Jacksonian democracy. 
Through a deal with their chief, Ikkemotubbe, he won the square mile of land that would 
eventually become Jefferson, MI, and would contain the Compson plantation. The next Quentin 
MacLachan and Jason Lycrugus would become, respectively, a governor of Mississippi and a 
Confederate general. From that point, Faulkner describes the Compsons who appear in the 
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narrative of The Sound and the Fury. After the war, the “old Compson place” as everyone called 
it fell into disrepair. Jason III, the current patriarch, continued to mortgage off pieces to pay for 
Caddy’s wedding and Quentin’s Harvard education. His children fared even worse. Though their 
former homestead continued to be known as the old Compson place, no Compson lived there. 
Caddy fled, and so did her daughter, Quentin committed suicide, and Jason committed Benjy to 
an asylum and sold off the rest of his family’s land. And so, the Compson wealth and prestige 
died along with the South. Faulkner often referred to this appendix as the key to the book, and it 
certainly informs a reader’s understanding of the previously discussed mythos of the South as 
having been the only region of the United States to have experienced the trauma of military and 
ideological defeat. Since the beginning, the Compsons were gamblers, and though briefly 
successful, continually ended up on the wrong side. The Compsons comprise one of the 
aristocratic families of Faulkner’s “apocryphal” Yoknapatwpha County, Mississippi where the 
influence of the long lost South haunts every citizen and inch of landscape. Many of Compson’s 
novels and short stories unfolded in this county, whose name, perhaps referencing its difficult 
history, means “water flows slow through flat land” in Chickasaw. The history of the Compsons, 
and their homestead of Jefferson, MI, unfolded in intimate connection with the rest of American 
history. Indeed, they lived the American Revolution, Jacksonian Democracy, Secession, the Civil 
War, the death of the South, and they will, tragically, live no more. The sound and fury of this 
blur of political upheaval and continued gambles consumes all who keep the Compson name. 
As previously mentioned, Faulkner discussed a desire to print Benjy’s narrative section in 
multiple colors to aid his readers’ understanding of the jumbled chronology, but insisted that he 
did not intend to write a difficult text. Despite his intention, the opening section, “April Seventh, 
1928” requires intense attention and careful reading, and is often cited as a classic example of 
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unreliable narration. Though Faulkner, after an exchange with his publisher, added several 
instances of italics to indicate major shifts in time and theme, and some sections follow standard 
grammatical and stylistic rules, other sections are barely comprehensible, and in all, the narrative 
includes recollections and impressions from at least seven different dates. Sartre comments that 
Faulkner did not write a traditional plot “so as to shuffle it afterwards like a pack of cards; he 
could not tell it in any other was…in order to arrive at real time, we must abandon this invented 
measure which is not a measure of anything” (317). Truly, Faulkner is experimenting with one of 
the most essential epistemological assumptions of any civilization: the progression of time.  
I could argue, confidently, that most readers would view Benjy’s understanding of time 
as deeply affected by his illness, and thus tragically unreliable. But, one must look past the 
established unreliability or unconventionality of the prose for the aesthetic purpose behind it. 
After all, Benjy and his stream of consciousness are fictional creations. Faulkner’s Compson 
chronology in the appendix begins not with a Compson, but with Ikkemotubbe, the 
“dispossessed American king” from whom Jason Lycurgus acquired the family land. 
Ikkemotubbe, who later Anglicized his nickname “Du Homme” to “Doom,” represents the first 
link in the chain of defeat and dispossession that lead to any understanding of what we presently 
call the United States of America. Dispossessed during Jacksonian democracy, the Mississippi 
Chickasaw were one of the few Native American tribes still living on their ancestral land by the 
mid-nineteenth century, and the inclusion of their legacy reminds the reader that the various 
Jason and Quentin Compsons were not the first or last to be engulfed by the current of time 
because of ideological and political shift. I think Sartre would also find a compelling similarity 
between Benjy’s observance of time and that of many native Pre-Columbian civilizations.  
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Currently, Western civilization perceives time as existing in constant linear motion split 
into years, months, days, hours, and so forth. Though most of these finite quantities are not 
imagined, but defined by the movement of celestial bodies, they are still, importantly, part of an 
ideologically created understanding of the universe. Medical anthropology textbooks often use 
this example to motivate students to think about culturally foreign medical practices and 
understandings of illness from a more culturally sensitive perspective. Most civilizations agree 
on the amount of time contained within a year, a month, and a day, as it is easily observable, but 
they do not necessarily agree on the evidence or the abstract meaning behind these values. Benjy 
can differentiate light from dark, and can observe the change of seasons, but he only recognizes 
past and present. He does not think with any conception of the future, and none of the other 
narrators choose to either. Subsequently, the future becomes, not a hopeless non-future as Sartre 
argues, but an ominous, haunting presence. Interestingly, the Compsons, especially Benjy, share 
this understanding with many Pre-Columbian civilizations, most notably, the Inca. The Inca saw 
the past and present as a valley or patchwork quilt laying in front the beholder where everything 
is visible, and existing together. Conversely, the future follows the individual as a lurking, 
invisible, and powerful presence. Suddenly, Benjy’s perspective holds much more validity and 
holds greater social significance.  
Faulkner stated several times that he was exploring the trauma of the death of the South, 
and though I do not think that he necessarily intended to make this connection, Benjy’s physical 
and psychological castration serves as an allegory for the stunted American South. Not only is 
his disability the result of generations of the obsession with keeping bloodlines pure to avoid any 
blackness or contamination, an Usher-like character, but his inability to see the future or express 
himself also speaks to the South’s greater disability as a broken ideological system. Through the 
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rise to power, countless American revolutions and prideful missions of Manifest Destiny all but 
exterminated already existing civilizations and forced them into obscurity. The same Chickasaw 
to whom the fictional Ikkemotubbe belongs still exist and live on reservations in the flatlands of 
Mississippi. Like most other still existing Native American tribes, they struggle to find 
livelihood and respect as equal citizens. They experience the highest rates of dislocation, 
poverty, alcoholism, mental illness and suicide among all demographic groups, and this is only 
the most recent episode in a long history of military conquest and extermination of indigenous 
people. The Compson wealth, again, inextricably linked with the bloody history of the Americas, 
depended on a long timeline of dispossession and slavery. This historicized reading is imperative 
in comprehending the trauma the Compson men experience, and Faulkner’s intention to both 
“escape and indict” this moment in American history (254).  
In the narrative of this family, not only is time difficult to discern because of a lack of 
standard continuity, but is also not discernable through speakers as members of different 
generations share the same name. But, at least in Benjy’s narrative section, one can tell at least 
relative time either by noticing which member of the Gibson family is taking care of Benjy, or 
more importantly, the status of Caddy. This falls in line with Faulkner’s multiple intimations that 
this narrative is about Caddy, and was inspired by the vision of Caddy, soiled, soggy drawers and 
all, rebelliously climbing up a pear tree as her brothers and caretakers looked on. In The Sound 
and the Fury: A Study in Perspective, Olga W. Vickery agrees with this notion, arguing that 
Caddy’s losing her virginity serves as the source of dramatic tension for the novel. Vickery adds 
the essential distinction that it is not the act itself that inflicts trauma upon her brothers, but it is 
“the significance which each of her brothers actually attributes to it,” and the structure of the 
novel forces the reader to “reconstruct the story and to apprehend its significance” in parallel 
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with grasping the brothers’ relation to it.  Importantly Faulkner never grants her a narrative 
voice. Though she is certainly sensitive to Benjy’s needs, much more so than the rest of the 
family, she is not a caretaker. Though she grieves for Quentin’s already clear end at her wedding 
and birth of her child, she is not his keeper. She is not devoted to being a Compson, to being a 
mother, or to honoring the ideology of the old South. Caddy is an independent character, and is 
the largely absent center of the novel both because she chose, physically, to leave her stifling 
family, but also because she did not intend to hold any more significance to her brothers than as 
that of a sister and friend. While the Compson narrators, Benjy, Quentin, and Jason, live 
traumatized by the passage of time, Caddy simply lives. Where her brothers become static 
characters, she displays a very real human complexity and dynamic personality compelling 
enough to inspire a novel.  
The split narratives: Benjy’s confusing pastiche of various losses, Quentin’s last words, 
Jason’s vitriolic condemnation of Caddy, and Dilsey’s endurance all create “a certain fullness of 
truth—truth diffused, distributed and, as it were, atmospheric” (325). Instead of saddling the 
narrators with reliability or unreliability, she sees the value of multiple perspectives culminating 
into a whole ideological atmosphere surrounding the gravitational force of the black hole left by 
Caddy.  
“CANDACE (CADDY). Doomed and knew it; accepted the doom without either seeking 
or fleeing it. Loved her brother despite him…love him not only in spite of but because of 
the fact that he himself was incapable of love, accepting the fact that he must value above 
all not her but the virginity of which she was custodian and on which she placed no value 
whatever: the frail physical stricture which to her was no more than a hangnail would 
have been…” (710-11). 
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Faulkner, though referencing Quentin specifically as the brother in this section of the appendix, 
might as well be addressing all three of her siblings. Benjy’s memory of her crying and shielding 
her face from him on the night that she lost her virginity, and her recognition of Quentin’s 
personally pre-determined future, suggest that she knew of her significance to her brothers, and 
loved them deeply. But, her actions also suggest that she, unlike her brothers, was not bound by 
time. She was an independent, though troubled, young, modern woman—probably George 
Fitzhugh’s worst nightmare. A far cry from the ideal Southern lady her brothers longed to re-
baptize her as, she had both strengths and flaws, and importantly, did not depend on virtues 
created by men in order to live. Though Caddy does not have the same mysterious, occult air of 
forbidden knowledge about her as Ligeia does, they share the intimidating vitality of a driven, 
passionate, sensual woman. Though we see even less of Ligeia’s perspective than of Caddy’s, 
perhaps she too drove her husband mad because she lived on her own terms. But Ligeia’s 
rebellion inflicted damage only on the one family member she had. 
Benjy’s, Quentin’s, and Jason’s genealogical descriptions in the above mentioned 
appendix, though they do not provide any new information, distill the brothers’ values for a more 
concise understanding of their narratives: 
Benjy  
“loved three things: the pasture which was sold to pay for Candace’s [Caddy’s] wedding 
and to send Quentin to Harvard, his sister Candace, firelight. Who lost none of them, 
because he could not remember his sister but only the loss of her, and firelight was the 
same bright shape as going to sleep, and the pasture was even better sold than before, 
because now he and Luster could not only follow timeless along the fence the motions 
which it did not even matter to him were human beings swinging golfsticks, Luster could 
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lead them to clumps of grass or weeds where there would appear suddenly in Luster’s 
hand, small white spherules which competed with and even conquered what he did not 
even know was gravity and all the immutable laws” (719).  
The first page of Benjy’s narrative consists of his description of a golf course as a series of 
motions, a flag, “red, flapping on the pasture,” a bird “slanting and tilting on it,” and a group of 
men who “were hitting” (Faulkner 3). Though we soon find out that this used to be his pasture, 
he does not seem bothered by the change in possession. He does not seem to understand what the 
golfers are doing, or the new purpose of the land, but he enjoys watching objects in motion, 
especially the projectile golf balls and the flame-like red flag. As he catches his pants crawling 
under the fence, he has his first flashback of Caddy caring for him, making sure he stayed warm 
as they climbed under that same fence. From there, Benjy jumps to another period where he 
insisted on going outside to meet Caddy as she came home from school. She lovingly rubs 
Benjy’s hands to warm them and he remarks that she “smelled like trees.” During this scene, 
Benjy is a toddler, and Caddy is school-aged and still innocent though inherently rebellious. 
Benjy looks up to her as a mother figure and finds her voice and her pastoral scent comforting 
and nurturing. Though he does not think of her as the embodiment of a social fantasy, Benjy sees 
Caddy as pure, kind, nurturing, devoted to his well-being, and an the embodiment of where he 
feels safest: his pasture, the physical remnant of the Compson plantation where a different 
Caddy, a golfer’s squire, still roams the land.  
During a later flashback, Benjy feels distress over Caddy putting on perfume when she is 
fourteen. She holds the bottle out to him saying “Sweet. Smell. Good.” Benjy backs away while 
still crying, and as Caddy understands that the scent of the perfume confuses him, she takes him 
in her arms and promises not to put it on, and in subsequent scenes she goes to the bathroom to 
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wash away the scent. Instead, she gives Benjy the perfume to give to Dilsey as a gift so he 
disassociates it from her. On that page alone, Benjy thinks, “Caddy smelled like trees” three 
times (28). During these scenes where Caddy begins to wear perfume, and begins to show signs 
of a budding sexuality, Benjy recognizes the change though all he can do to express his unease is 
howl. In the scenes where she is still able to wash the scent away, she is still a virgin. Benjy’s 
memory always ends in her smelling of tree, and she seems to be perceptive as to why. This 
makes his memory of her losing her virginity even more poignant and painful. Caddy comes 
home late, and as Benjy begins to cry from failing to catch the scent of trees, she “shrank against 
the wall,” and “her eyes ran.” Benjy pulls her to the bathroom though she tries to stop him, and 
“she stood against the door, looking at me. Then she put her arm across her face and I pushed at 
her, crying” (46). She did not try to wash away the scent, and Benjy jumps to a different memory 
without noting a scent of trees. Though Benjy suffers when she gets pregnant, gets married, and 
runs away, this initial loss as Caddy grows from girl to woman seems the most traumatizing as it 
is the original fall from grace. He cannot identify her as a representation of the ideal Southern 
lady, and he doubtfully knows what that is, or what an ideology is, because of his stunted 
cognitive development. Because of this, his interpretation of Caddy as the pastoral equivalent to 
the nurturing, maternal, but pure, angelic lady carries more gravity. Though ideology crafts 
reality to every beholder, and any realization of flaws within its fabric is traumatic, according to 
Žižek, surely to one who sees fire when he falls asleep, and sees the world as sound and fury, the 
maintenance of the symbols which define his world is even more important. 
Quentin, the second Compson narrator, sustains a similar loss to Benjy, and arguably 
suffers more because of Caddy’s loss of innocence than does Benjy. His passage is absolutely 
static. At the close of his academic year at Harvard, Quentin lives his final hours before 
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committing suicide by way of drowning. Sartre draws the reader attention to a lack of potential 
in Quentin’s future. Though he narrates the passage of several hours, Faulkner later states that he 
had been dead since the day of Caddy’s wedding, and like “long since dead South,” he is simply 
marking time. Since his future shows no probability, but only finality, Quentin’s perception 
becomes just as much of a shattered mosaic of recollection and impression as Benjy’s narrative 
section (Sartre 319-20). He is no more reliable than Benjy, but, to Quentin’s harm, he has the 
intellectual capacity to articulate and dramatize his trauma at the hands of time. Quentin’s 
description in the appendix reads: 
“QUENTIN III: Who loved not his sister’s body but some concept of Compson honor 
precariously and (he knew well) only temporarily supported by the minute fragile 
membrane of her maidenhead as a miniature replica of all the whole vast globy earth may 
be poised on the nose of a trained seal. Who loved not the idea of the incest which he 
would not commit, but some Presbyterian concept of its eternal punishment: he, not God, 
could by that means cast himself and his sister both into hell, where he could guard her 
forever and keep here forevermore intact amid the eternal fires” (710). 
His appendix description also states that above all, Quentin loved death, as it was the only way to 
escape the passage of time. On June 2, 1910, the date of his suicide, Quentin dismantles the 
watch his father gave him, saying that “time is dead as long as it is being clicked off by little 
wheels; only when the clock stops does time come to life” (56). Sartre interprets this as a 
symbolic gesture where Quentin “gives us access to a time without clocks” similar to Benjy’s 
(318). In fact, Vickery argues that Quentin’s “hopeless and endless brooding is but Benjy’s moan 
become articulate though not rational” across a narrative section twice as long as Benjy’s. 
Quentin similarly jumps between several memories connected to Caddy’s relationship with 
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Dalton Ames, a classmate onto whom he grafts the personality of Ames and attempts to fight 
with, and discussions with his father about Caddy’s pregnancy. Jason III, the children’s father, 
intimates to Quentin that all human experience is absurd and pathological—he calls the 
speculation of time passing “a symptom of mind-function. Excrement Father said like 
sweating”—and in doing so, he upsets Quentin’s deep valuing of an ideology surrounding purity 
and virginity (51).  
He struggles to comprehend Caddy’s sexuality and keeps trying to tell his father, bluntly, 
“I have committed incest I said Father is was I it was not Dalton Ames” (53). Jason does not 
believe him, recognizing that his son is speaking through some ideological trauma and maintains 
that “purity is a negative state and therefore contrary to nature,” and that “men invented virginity 
not women” (77, 52). Though Jason expresses some progressive points of view for a man of his 
time and social position, Quentin sees this as a nihilistic rejection of his own values, of an 
obsessive belief that an incestuous match would undo the disorder caused by Caddy’s union with 
Dalton Ames. Ironically, the act that Quentin imagines would fix the dereliction in his family 
likely led to Benjy’s birth defects, the most frightening physical manifestation of this very 
dereliction. In this rejection of his father’s less dogmatic prescriptions, Quentin grapples with the 
failure of a further tessellation of the Courtly Love derivative ideal of honor he has placed upon 
Caddy’s shoulders. His belief paradoxical belief that committing the deep sin of incest with his 
sister will return her virtue perpetuates the same type of sado-masochistic male-driven 
ideological fantasy Žižek addresses in “Courtly Love, or Woman as Thing.” Quentin’s repeated 
dwelling on memories of trying to fix Caddy, and his hatred for Caddy’s lover Dalton as well as 
her husband, Herbert, then take on a deeper meaning manifestations of moments he sees as 
incongruous and perverse to his ideological reality.  
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This trauma logically points to his resolving to redirect his attention to escaping the 
painful consequences of this failure. If he cannot commit both himself and Caddy to hell where 
she can exist as something ethereal and intangible, and thus pure in his imagination, he will at 
least free himself from the suffering of watching her live in sin. Quentin’s bondage does not 
necessarily lie only in time, as Sartre suggests, but in his perspective, and his need to create order 
in a life that is inherently disordered and illogical. Instead of being bound in a chamber, being 
haunted by allegorical representations of one’s fear in a classic gothic text, Quentin succumbs to 
ghosts that he has created. The terror of his depression and suicide lies in the fact that he haunts 
himself. His unconventional perspective and narrative opposes all that was Benjy’s—he is too 
logical and ideologically driven rather than not having any concept of logic or ideology—but 
they share the same traumatic experience, and Quentin, equipped with too much resolution and 
autonomy refuses to live that trauma any longer. Caddy, as Faulkner explains in the appendix, 
fully aware of the gravity with which her brothers regarded her, resolved to name her child 
Quentin, no matter the sex, “after the brother whom they both…knew was already the same as 
dead when she married” (711). 
 The final Compson sibling, and the third narrator of Faulkner’s text, Jason IV adopts a 
vastly different perspective on the events surrounding his family. He is not a conventionally 
unreliable narrator. He is intelligent, successful, and shrewdly masochistic. Compared to the 
confusing and slow unfolding of events in Benjy and Quentin’s sections, Jason’s section “offers 
no barriers to comprehension” (Vickery 331). In fact, he explains all events and actions “in terms 
of cause and effect, profit and loss” (332). But, as Vickery points out, Jason’s section is no truer, 
but equally true, and equally distorted to that of his brothers. His logic and lack of empathy 
“isolates [him] as effectively as the moral abstractions of Quentin or the complete dependence on 
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sensations of Benjy” (332). He revels in his isolation and self-sufficiency, as he sees it as a mark 
of superiority, and believes that he has the firmest grasp on reality among his family. Vickery 
qualifies that his narrative section is “a new and welcome perspective on the Compsons,” as well 
as a respite from the intellectual challenge of sifting through the first 100 pages of difficult 
perspectives, but “it is just a perspective and not the final word that Jason makes it out to be” 
(332). His perspective, bereft of empathy, reduces all interaction to a series of quantitative 
exchanges signaling profit or loss, and thus he views Caddy not as a tragic fallen angel or maiden 
in a pasture, but as a selfish, morally loose woman. 
 Not only is Jason calculating and deeply un-empathetic, as Vickery points out, he is also 
sadistic. Dilsey’s family and his other siblings do not trust him, and recognize his malicious 
nature. Benjy, in his narrative, recalls a time when Jason III had to hold Caddy back from 
attacking Jason after he had cut Benjy’s paper dolls to shreds and feigned ignorance. He showed 
blatant contempt for Benjy, as well as Caddy, as a child, and as an adult, he clearly gains 
pleasure from annoying and tormenting others. He recalls in his own narrative section a time 
when he had two tickets to a show he had no intention of seeing. Luster, Dilsey’s son, asks for 
one of the tickets, but Jason, knowing Luster has no money, asks that he either pay five cents, or 
he burns the tickets. Though Luster begs that he will “fix dem [car] tires ev’y day fer a mont,” 
Jason insists that he “need[s] the cash” and drops the tickets into the stove (167). Still, he 
reserves a special hatred for Caddy and Miss Quentin. Benjy and Quentin, of course, implicitly 
attribute the same misfortune to Caddy’s fall from innocence, but Jason blames her directly, as 
well as her daughter, Miss Quentin, for having a direct hand in his personal failures, and he 
curses his sour lot of being chained to them by blood.  
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This is clear from the very first line of his narrative in reference to the teen-aged Miss 
Quentin: “Once a bitch always a bitch, what I say” (119). His narrative sections begins with this 
line in media res during a discussion with his mother, Caroline, about Miss Quentin’s inherited 
rebelliousness, promiscuity, and from his perspective, ungratefulness. Indeed, Quentin resembles 
her mother, and Faulkner describes her as “fatherless nine months before her birth, nameless at 
birth and already doomed to be unwed from the instant the dividing egg determined its sex” 
(719). Caroline, though upset with her for cutting school, instructs Jason to “remember she’s 
your own flesh and blood.” He responds by subverting her use of thinking about someone as 
flesh and blood as a metaphor for family in order to elicit empathy into a crass suggestion of 
violence, and qualifies the violence as a proper punishment. “Sure…that’s just what I’m think 
of—flesh. And a little blood too, if I had my way” (120). Indeed, he grabs Quentin and, 
loosening his belt, threatens to beat her until Dilsey, apparently the only being he “fear[ed] and 
respect[ed],” and his “sworn enemy” who had always detected evil in him, intervenes (Faulkner 
716). Still, he threatens to beat Dilsey as well, and pushes her aside. After the scene is over, he 
privately thinks about more ways to torment Dilsey and Quentin. 
Though he sees Caddy, and Quentin as an extension of Caddy, as the root of the illness 
rotting through his homestead, Jason leeches life and money from all those around him and 
values his own success and well being far more than the well being of others. From Jason’s 
section, we learn that Quentin is certainly her mother’s daughter, and that Caddy is well off 
enough to send a substantial monthly check for her. But most profoundly, we learn how cold and 
self-centered Jason is. His section moves quickly and without the many intricacies that make 
Benjy and Quentin’s sections so difficult to follow. Jason’s present life contains only one 
intricate scheme of cheating all of his family members of their money. He has the now senile 
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Caroline grant him power of attorney, supposedly so he can deposit his wages into her account. 
In reality, he keeps his wages in a separate account devoted to his mistress. In the meantime, he 
mortgages off more and more pieces of the family land, eventually institutionalizes Benjy to be 
free having to care for him, and deposits the checks Caddy sends for Quentin, which he 
duplicates and has Caroline burn as a symbolic rejection of Caddy, into his mother’s account as 
his wages. Jason displays advanced reasoning skills and possesses a brilliant mind. Certainly, he 
does not embody the classic image of an unreliable narrator, one who misunderstands the 
implicit rules of his own text. But, he is cold, and through the intense power of his hatred-fueled 
tunnel vision, he provides an absolutely subjective perspective that is just as singular in focus as 
his brothers’, whom he recognizes as “crazy” (153). But, though he sees every other member of 
his family as a disgrace to the Compson family name, Jason plays the most active role in the 
final chapter of its demise. He alienates the final generation of Compson, Miss Quentin, castrates 
Benjy, refuses to grieve for Quentin, and finally sells off the rest of the old Compson place. 
Jason’s narrative voice represents a paranoid reading unable to move past unreliability and the 
least productive reaction to ideological shift. Jason refuses to understand himself as a subject of 
time. 
The final narrative section, Easter Sunday, April eighth, 1928 adopts the perspective of a 
semi-omniscient narrator focused on Dilsey Gibson, the matriarch of the family who serve the 
Compsons. Dilsey is warm, nurturing, and non-judgmental. She remains the only member of the 
household to understand Benjy’s need for routine, shows compassion for Caroline, defends 
Caddy despite her faults, and defends Miss Quentin and Luster from Jason’s anger. As Vickery 
says, “her very presence enables the reader to achieve a final perspective” on the Compson’s 
shortcomings and dysfunctions (333). Vickery continues to name Dilsey as a figure of passive 
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resistance and as a beacon of the “ethical norm” from which the Compsons have deviated. 
Though she shows the most empathy and compassion, I do not think Dilsey’s purpose in the text 
is to point out the moral shortcomings of the Compsons. She does not view them as inherently 
bad people and does not pass judgment. Instead, she attempts to express compassion and 
empathy. She takes Benjy to church with her because does not view his intellect as a barrier to 
deserving love and experiencing the power of faith. She sees Miss Quentin as a wild and unruly 
child, but still offers her comfort and compassion.  She thinks that Caddy’s adulterous pregnancy 
was unfortunate, but defends her in her absence and cares for her child. Even to Jason, she says 
“aint you shamed” every time he threatens or badmouths someone, suggesting a hope that he 
could attempt a change for the better (167). Instead, I feel that Dilsey, and the rest of the Gibson 
family, serve as a representative of the possible future which Sartre denies Faulkner’s 
metaphysics of time from having. As Benjy and Quentin narrate only in the past tense, in the 
form of recollection, and Jason narrates only in the present connected with the personal speech 
indicator, “I says,” Dilsey does not seem bound by time. As she, her family, and Benjy sit in 
church on Easter Sunday, she calms Benjy by saying, “Hush, now. Dey fixin to sing in a minute” 
(191). Though the future in this scene moves only minute by minute, by an anticipation of 
singing, Dilsey, importantly, speaks of the future bringing happiness and relief.  
After the Easter sermon, Dilsey thinks of the preacher’s words on the finality and great 
equalizing force of death and comments that she “seed de first en de last…seed de beginning, en 
now [she] sees de endin” of the Compson family (194). This statement seems neither happy nor 
sad, but speaks to an almost biblical steadiness, and the omniscient view of a cycle in time. In 
Faulkner’s appendix, Dilsey’s entry reads, simply, “They endured” (721). Though she has 
watched this last generation of the Compsons come into the world and leave it, Dilsey does not 
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see time as the bringer of death and decay as the Compsons do. Importantly, she is of a different 
social class and a different position relative to the Civil War than the other narrators. The three 
ideologically stunted Compson men represent the shell-shocked generation of the newly dead 
South that Faulkner intended to both defend and indict. They are white men, descendants of a 
Confederate general who belonged to an aristocratic plantation-owning family. Though they did 
not lose their property or name in the war, they lost the support of the ideological system that 
built their wealth. They cling to the idea of Compson family honor, unfortunately encapsulated in 
Caddy’s transient virginity, because it is the last vestige of their former glory. Their South, the 
plantation South, indeed, perished in the war and left them to deal with a profound ideological 
schism. Following Žižek’s definition of ideology and fantasy as both creating and informing a 
sense of reality, one can conclude that the Compsons did not stand a chance. What the reader 
sees in Benjy’s and Quentin’s narrative, the sound and the fury of an immensely different 
ideological system, is arguably what the Compsons saw of their new reality and of Caddy’s 
traditionally masculine sexuality and rebellious nature. Dilsey, an African American woman with 
a very recent cultural memory of slavery and subservience to this same antiquated system, did 
not share this trauma. The Gibsons dealt and changed with the current of time and the massive 
ideological shift in the south following the Civil War and abolition of slavery while the Compson 
men have not. Since the Gibsons did not belong to the same social class to which the Compsons, 
and Poe’s narrator in “Ligeia,” belonged, the obsession with the ideological fantasy of female 
purity and great family honor did not apply.  
I disagreed earlier with Sartre’s identification of Faulkner’s metaphysics of time as 
deterministic and of pointing to a close non-future. Certainly, the Compson men have reached 
the end. Quentin committed suicide, Benjy was castrated and institutionalized, and Jason died 
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childless. Ligeia’s narrator, though Poe never determined his future, likely did not recover from 
the terrifying haunting he experienced. They all fail in maintaining their wealth, in staying pure, 
in staying sane, in staying alive, because they are paralyzed in adhering to antiquated and narrow 
ideological systems. But Caddy and Quentin disappeared in the wind and lived a non-Compson-
dependent future, and Dilsey’s family—they endured. Faulkner did not withhold a future from 
those who could see one.  
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Concluding Thoughts 
Why read Poe and Faulkner together? Both of these works present the consequence of the 
problematic male-driven fantasy of a pure, honorable, ideal Southern lady. In both works, the 
insistence on forcing this image upon a real woman brings severe consequences. Where Poe’s 
narrator transformed his deceased wife, Ligeia, into a surreal monster within the confines of a 
gothic horror story, the Compson men turned Caddy into a monstrous shadow haunting their 
fragile psyches.  
Through Poe’s narrator, the reader grasps the precarious and antagonistic nature of this 
myth. The South’s revival and incomplete emulation of both feudal tradition and the literary 
conception of Courtly Love that accompanied it in Europe defined success and moral prestige as 
inextricably linked with the institution of servitude. The ideal Southern lady represented, 
problematically, both the angelic idol of morality, the long suffering Virgin Mary, and the ideal 
servant, essentially a beast of burden. The ignorance and displacement of the complexity of 
character within a real human being prescribed an impossible duty to contemporary women. 
When they failed to conform, they no longer deserved familial love or respect, and contracted a 
socially dangerous sense of otherness. Poe’s Ligeia, a woman reincarnated as one misrepresented 
myth inside another, proves to be contagious and absolutely disruptive. She possesses the body 
of another and brings the narrative to a screeching halt. Though this can be read as a classic 
gothic tale, and one of many mass-produced narrative shells, this work proves to contain a much 
more compelling underlying social critique when read as unreliable in service of an aesthetic 
goal rather than simply unreliable. 
Faulkner’s Caddy Compson similarly stops time. But, instead of exploring the fantasy she 
fails to embody, the narrators reveal the aftermath of both her subjective failure and the 
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shattering of the wider ideology of the antebellum South. The pall of imagined disgrace inflicts 
psychological torment on Benjy’s already terrifyingly confused mind, transforms into a 
consuming bitterness in Jason, and leads Quentin to commit suicide to avoid the anguish. Where 
Poe’s piece explores the surreal depths of a problematic social fantasy, Faulkner’s men depict the 
very terrestrial and human consequences of continuing to live by the moral code of Poe’s time 
long after it had been retired. In order to gleam this analysis from these texts, one must read past 
reliability versus unreliability and adopt an unconventional, panoramic perspective similar to that 
of Dilsey’s section. In fact, one must read with an ever-evolving theory of a purpose to 
Faulkner’s aesthetic choice of unreliability in order to understand the tragedy of the stagnant 
plot. As I have hopefully shown, the fact of unreliability is much less important than the insights 
it may bring.  
By reading through an unconventional perspective with an open mind, readers can gain 
important cognitive tools for addressing the value of similar unreliable or unconventional 
perspectives in other texts, as well as in other humans. This, hopefully, serves as an example of 
fantasy informing ideology in a positive, if still antagonistic, way. By choosing to read past 
unreliability, individuals can cultivate more informed opinions on the pressing social issues of 
their time, such as gender identity and equality, and sexual rights. Doctors can provide their 
patients with more compassion, and thus with a more positive healing experience, by addressing 
the individual experience of illness. Looking through another’s eyes is the preamble to, to 
borrow a phrase from Judith Butler, stepping beside one’s self. 
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Appendix A: “The Octoroon Mistress,” BRADY 2003 
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Appendix B: “Proserpina,” Dante Gabriel Rossetti 1877 
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Appendix C: “Ligeia,” Harry Clarke 1919 
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